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CHALLENGING POLITICAL BOUNDARIES IN POST-
CONFLICT STATES 
ANGELA M. BANKS* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Constitution making in post-conflict states is in the midst of a 
conceptual transformation. Traditionally these constitutions have 
been viewed as power maps that are products of elite-brokered 
deals, often written by foreign experts.1 The process generally 
takes place outside of the public eye with no input from average 
citizens or civil society. Such constitutions tend to regulate the 
distribution of political, economic, and social power in ways that 
address the concerns and interests of the elite drafters. This has led 
to the adoption of constitutions that entrench the political power of 
the elite drafters, limit the development of competitive political 
opposition, and fail to create institutional and procedural 
mechanisms for addressing existing and future political, economic, 
or social conflicts. 
Rwanda adopted a different approach, a participatory 
approach.2 The Legal and Constitutional Commission ("LCC"), 
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Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Lani Guinier, Zachary Lorna, Cherry A. McGee, Makau 
Mutua, and Mary Dudziak, and the participants in the Constitutional Politics in 
Africa Seminar at Harvard Law School. I would also like to thank the Reginald F. 
Lewis Fellowship for Law Teaching and Harvard Law School for providing 
resources and support. 
1 See, e.g., H .W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions without Constitutionalism: 
Reflections on an African Political Paradox, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: 
TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 65 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 
1993) (conceptualizing constitutions as power maps). 
2 This approach was undertaken in an effort to implement participatory 
constitution-making. The Legal and Constitutional Commission ("LCC") sought 
public involvement in the process because it viewed the opinions of each citizen 
as vital for making the constitution a "common denominator of all Rwandans." 
Republic of Rwanda Legal & Const. Conun'n, The Commission Started Gathering 
Views on the Draft Constitution Oan. 15, 2002), http://www.cjcr.gov.rw / 
eng/newsOOl.htrn (last visited Oct. 21, 2007) [hereinafter The Commission Started 
105 
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the body responsible for drafting Rwanda's 2003 Constitution, 
traveled throughout the country to discuss the state's future 
constitution with Rwandan citizens.3 The LCC members attended 
public meetings in which citizens had the opportunity to share 
their concerns, ideas, and recommendations.4 
The literature on participatory constitution making contends 
that citizen participation facilitates democratization by grounding 
the state's governance system in a set of principles and practices 
for which there is a national consensus.s The process by which the 
Gathering Views]; see also Republic of Rwanda Legal & Const. Comm'n, Give Us 
Your Suggestions, http:/ jwww.cjcr.gov.rwjeng/suggestions.htm (last visited Oct. 
21, 2007 [hereinafter Give Us Your Suggestions] ("In order to establish the 
Constitution that suits all Rwandans, we call upon every person who will go on 
this site internet to give advice and views which will be considered while 
elaborating the Constitution."). The resulting Constitution is, however, 
remarkably similar to those drafted exclusively by elites with one notable 
exception-women's political participation. The Constitution requires thirty 
percent of the members of both legislative houses to be women, which led to the 
election of 39 women to the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of Rwanda's 
parliament) in 2003. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA art. 62, 76, 82; 
Inter-Parliamentary Union, Women in National Parliaments: World Classification, 
Sept. 30, 2003, http:/ /www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arcjclassif300903.htm (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2007) (48.8% of the members of the Chamber of Deputies are women). 
This represents the largest percentage of women, 48.8%, sitting in a lower or 
single legislative house. Inter-Parliamentary Union, Women in National 
Parliaments: World Classification, Jan. 31, 2007, http:/ /www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/ 
classif310107.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2007). Women make up 45.3% of Rwanda's 
national parliament (both chambers), ranking second to Sweden's single chamber 
parliament, which is 47.3% female. Id. 
3 Throughout this article, I use the term "citizen" to refer to an individual 
residing within the post-conflict state rather than a narrower legal category of 
individuals entitled to particular rights and benefits within a given state. 
4 The LCC accepted both oral and written communication from citizens. 
Verbal communication took place at the public meetings and written 
communication occurred in the form of responses to the LCC-issued 
questionnaires or independently drafted recommendation reports. 
s See generally Vivien Hart, Constitution-Making and the Transformation of 
Conflict, 26 PEACE & CHANGE 153, 159-60 (2001) [hereinafter Constitution-Making] 
(stating that in recent constitutional experiences, citizens have criticized 
constitutions written solely by elites and instead have demanded a constructive 
role in the constitution drafting process); HASSEN EBRAHIM, KAYODE FAYEMI, & 
STEPHANIE LOOMIS, PROMOTING A CULTURE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 
IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA (Commw. Human Rights Initiative, Background Paper 
to accompany CHRI's Recommendations to CHOGM 1999) (1999), available at 
http:// www.humanrightsinitiative.org/ publications/ const/ constitutionalism 
_booklet_1999.pdf; VIVIEN HART, DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION MAKING 
3-4 (2003), available at http:/ /www.usip.org/pubs/specialreportsjsr107.pdf 
[hereinafter DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION] (arguing that a democratic constitution 
"is made in a democratic process."); Otive Igbuzor, Constitution Making in 
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constitution is adopted is as important as the substance of the 
document. Public dialogue and deliberation are thus essential 
components of the process.6 Rwanda used a participatory 
constitution-making process, and it adopted a Constitution that 
enjoys a high level of domestic support, is deemed legitimate by 
the citizens, and effectively addresses a variety of issues important 
to women.7 Despite these noteworthy achievements, it is equally 
noticeable that the Constitution regulates political parties in ways 
that entrench the ex ante power configuration. For example, the 
2003 Constitution prohibited political parties from operating 
offices at the local level, which limited the development of local 
constituencies.s The Constitution also states that political parties 
can be banned for engaging in divisive behavior. The vague 
definition of divisive behavior has had a chilling effect on the 
development of robust political parties.9 
Nigeria: Lessons for Making a People's Constitution (Aug. 19-24, 2001) 
(unpublished discussion paper presented at the Conference on Constitutional 
Development, Kibuye, Rwanda), available at http:/ /www.cdd.org.uk/cfcr/ 
constitutionlessons.htm (noting that a people's constitution reflects the "wishes 
and aspirations of the people."). Otive Igbuzor is the Secretary for the Citizen's 
Forum for Constitutional Reform, an organization founded through a Centre for 
Democracy and Development project. 
6 See IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 50 (2000) ("In a society 
where there are social group differences and significant injustice, democratic 
politics ought to be a process of struggle. Far from a face-off in enemy opposition, 
struggle is a process of communicative engagement of citizens with one another."); 
Constitution-Making, supra note 5, at 157-61 (conceptualizing constitution-making 
as a negotiation, part of the conflict transformation process). Participatory 
constitution-making draws heavily on participatory and deliberative democratic 
ideas about the normative and instrumental value of citizen participation and 
public dialogue. See, e.g., Constitution-Making, supra note 5 (describing the role of 
constitution-making in transforming conflict); Kirsti Samuels, Post-Conflict Peace-
Building and Constitution-Making, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 663 (2006) (discussing the 
importance of democratic constitution-making in promoting peace and good 
governance). 
7 See Samuels, supra note 6, at n.26 (noting that the consultative process in 
drafting Rwanda's Constitution resulted in a highly popular document); PRISCILLA 
YACHAT ANKUT, INT'L INST. DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, THE ROLE OF 
CONSTITUTION-BUILDING PROCESSES IN DEMOCRATIZATION: CASE STUDY RWANDA 17-
18 (2005), available at http:/ /www.idea.int/ conflict/ cbp (highlighting the factors 
that make the Rwandan Constitution popular amongst it constituents). 
s However, the text was modified in 2005 to state that political parties may 
establish offices at the national level. See Amendment No. 2 of Aug. 12, 2005, 
CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA art. 2, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
RWANDA (indicating that change). 
9 A potentially significant opposition party, the Mouvement Democratique 
Republicain (Democratic Republican Movement) was disbanded by the 
108 U. Pa. J. Int'l. L. [Vol. 29:1 
Within the growing literature on participatory constitution 
making in post-conflict or transitional societies, there has been 
insufficient analysis of issues related to institutional and 
procedural design. This literature makes normative and 
instrumental claims about the benefits of participatory constitution 
making without analyzing the relationship between institutional 
and procedural design decisions and the quality and quantity of 
citizen participation. Just as there are a variety of electoral systems 
that reward and penalize different types of electoral behavior, 10 
there are different types of participatory systems and they differ in 
their capacity to facilitate or frustrate citizen participation. This 
Article introduces the concepts of external and internal 
participatory systems to assist in analyzing the different types of 
participatory systems used to draft constitutions in post-conflict 
states. This binary provides a mechanism for identifying the 
institutions and procedures that are most effective in achieving the 
normative and instrumental goals of participatory constitution 
making. 
External participatory systems exclude citizens from the 
forums in which substantive drafting decisions are made. The 
drafting body is generally small and appointed by the government. 
Citizens are only given the opportunity to interact with the 
Transitional National Assembly in 2003, just before the first national elections 
under the new Constitution. See infra text accompanying notes 191-94. 
to Scholars have examined how to encourage a diverse range of candidates to 
run so that citizens would have meaningful choices; how to create an environment 
in which citizens feel comfortable voting for their candidate of choice; what rules 
or procedures might limit the electoral success of extremist candidates; and 
whether or not particular governance systems discourage extremism. See generally 
DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (1985) (analyzing theoretical, 
political, and military aspects of ethnic conflict, and discussing strategies for 
conflict resolution); DONALD L. HOROWITZ, A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA? 
CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING IN A DIVIDED SOCIEfY (1991) (discussing the 
challenges of constitution-making in a racially divided context); AREND LIJPHART, 
PAITERNS OF DEMOCRACY: GoVERNMENT FORMS AND PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX 
COUNTRIES (1999) (describing majoritarian and consensual governance structures 
in different contexts); AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SociETIES: A 
COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION (1977) (comparing experiences in democracies in 
heterogeneous societies); Arend Lijphart, Consodational Democracy, 21 WORLD POL. 
207 (1969), reprinted in CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY: PoLmCAL ACCOMMODATION 
IN SEGMENTED SociETIES 79 (Kenneth D. McRae ed., 1974) (describing workable 
forms of democratic governance in divided societies); Ben Reilly, The Alternative 
Vote and Ethnic Accommodation: New Evidence from Papua New Guinea, 16 
ELECTORAL STUD. 1 (1997) (examining the effects of the alternative vote system in 
Papua New Guinea). 
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drafting body through public meetings and written submissions. 
Additionally there are few, if any, rules or guidelines ensuring that 
the drafting body will systematically review and consider the 
public's feedback. The alternative to this type of participatory 
system is an internal. system in which individuals participate, 
directly or through representatives, in the drafting forums in which 
substantive decisions are made. Furthermore, the agenda-setting 
and decision-making rules facilitate drafters reviewing and 
deliberating a wide variety of proposals. 
Based on a case study of gender equity advocates in Rwanda, 
external participatory systems only enable those individuals who 
mobilize, obtain influential allies, and implement an effective 
framing strategyn to make substantive contributions to the 
constitution-making process. These factors increase the likelihood 
that public comments and recommendations will be reviewed and 
deliberated. Rather than opening the floodgates to democratic 
governance, external participatory systems provide narrow 
political opportunities that only a limited segment of the 
population is able to utilize effectively. Such narrow opportunities 
during the early reconstruction years in a post-conflict state can 
play an important role in entrenching a commitment to democratic 
governance. They do not, however, facilitate broad citizen 
participation in substantive discussions and deliberations that is 
necessary for achieving one of the fundamental goals of 
participatory constitution making- developing a national 
consensus for a set of governance principles and practices.12 
11 See ERVING GoFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS 21 (1974), where the term "frame" 
was first introduced to refer to "schemata of interpretation" that allow an 
individual "to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of 
concrete occurrences ... . ";see also David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Master 
Frames and Cycles of Protest, in FRONTIERS IN SoCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 133, 137 
(Aldon D. Morris & Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992) (stating that the term 
"frame" is used within the sociological literature on social movements to refer to 
"an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the 'world out there' by 
selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and 
sequences of actions within one's present or past environment .. . . Collective 
action frames not only perform this focusing and punctuating role; they also 
function simultaneously as modes of attribution and articulation."). 
12 Scholars examining participatory decision-making, and advocates of such 
processes, often discuss three instrumental benefits of participatory decision-
making: legitimacy, public support, and effective decisions. See, e.g., E. ALLAN 
LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JuSTICE 64 (1988) 
(noting that procedural preferences linked to fairness impact citizen satisfaction 
and support for legal institutions); YOUNG, supra note 6, at 5-6 (arguing that the 
"legitimacy of a democratic decision depends on the degree to which those 
110 U. Pa. ]. Int'l. L. (Vol. 29:1 
This Article is divided into four sections. Section 2 introduces 
the distinction between external and internal participatory 
systems. This section then discusses the participatory constitution-
making process used in Rwanda, identifying the modes of citizen 
participation, the procedures governing citizen participation, and 
the drafter's use of citizen comments, recommendations, and 
proposals. Section 3 conceptualizes participatory constitution 
making as a tool for creating democratic states by increasing 
political inclusion. Social movements are a key instrument for 
bringing about such changes within a society. Using the 
sociological literature on social movements, this section identifies 
the factors relevant for the emergence, sustainability, and success 
of social movements. These factors are instructive in analyzing 
who within a society is able to successfully utilize external 
participatory constitution-making processes. Section 3 also argues 
that Rwanda's constitution-making process exemplifies an external 
participatory system in which most citizens were unable to 
contribute to, or participate in, the discussions, debates, or 
deliberations in which substantive decisions regarding the 
constitution were made. Access to, and influence within, these 
decision-making forums were limited to those that mobilized, 
obtained influential allies, and implemented effective framing 
strategies. Section 4 discusses the ability to achieve internal 
inclusion in Rwanda. This argument is developed through an 
analysis of gender equity advocates' quest for constitutional 
affected by it have been included in the decision-making processes and have had 
the opportunity to influence the outcomes."); Seyla Benhabib, Models of Public 
Space, in HABERMAS AND THE PuBLIC SPHERE 73, 87 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992) 
(noting that deliberation among political equals is the basis of democratic 
legitimacy because it enables "those affected by [the general] social norms and 
collective political decisions [to] have a say in their formulation, stipulation, and 
adoption."); Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Deepening Democracy: Innovations in 
Empowered Participatory Governance, 29 PoL. & SOC'Y 5, 10 (2001) (exploring ways, 
based on previous documented efforts, to empower citizens to participate in the 
political process); Igbuzor, supra note 5 (arguing for participatory decision-making 
in Africa); Samuels, supra note 6, at 665 (arguing that the "adoption of 
participatory democratic governance structures is best able to ensure peace and 
legitimacy."); DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 11 (offering lessons 
learned to make democratic constitution-making genuine); EBRAHIM ET AL., supra 
note 5 (advocating the need for inclusive processes for the democratic betterment 
of the Commonwealth); see also David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1764 (2005); Devra C. Moehler, Public Participation and 
Support for the Constitution in Uganda 26 (2003) (unpublished paper, on file with 
author) (testing the claim as to whether participation in constitution-making 
results in more popular support for the resulting constitution). 
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provisions regarding women's political participation and gender 
equity in public and private life. 
2. PARTICIPATORY CONSTITUTION MAKING 
Many international actors and constitution drafters in post-
conflict states have adopted a new participatory perspective on 
constitution making. Drawing on the normative claims of 
participatory democratic theory, these actors start from the premise 
that a democratic constitution must not only create a democratic 
state but must also be created and adopted through democratic 
processes.n Such a process must enable those who will be 
governed by the constitution to participate in the drafting process, 
and the process should be transparent and accountable to the 
people.14 Constitution making in post-conflict states serves a 
variety of functions. First, it produces a constitution that creates 
the state's governance framework, which provides for the 
allocation of executive, legislative, and judicial functions, details 
citizens' rights, and regulates access to power and resources. 
Second, it becomes a forum for discussing and negotiating divisive 
or contested issues that are often related to the recent armed 
conflict. Third, it serves as a public resource for democratic 
education, and it potentially enables a consensus-based vision of 
the state's future to develop.1s Finally, it facilitates the adoption of 
a document that is both constitutive and transformative.16 
13 See Samuels, supra note 6, at 667-68 (noting that how a constitution is 
drafted and adopted impacts the resulting state structure); Constitution-Making, 
supra note 5, at 156-57 (arguing that "new constitutionalism" or constitution-
making as a participatory process is necessitated by the intrastate nature of recent 
conflicts); DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 3-4 (emphasizing that a 
constitution for diverse groups of people should be made through a democratic 
process); Angela M. Banks, Expanding Participation in Constitution Making: 
Challenges and Opportunities, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) 
(discussing participatory democratic theory and participatory constitution-
making); Guido Galli, The Role of Constitution-Building Processes in 
Democratization (May 29, 2005) (working paper on file with Int'l IDEA). 
14 See DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 4 (arguing that norms of 
transparency and accountability in daily political decision-making are now also 
demanded of the constitution-making process). 
1s See Samuels, supra note 6, at 667 (discussing the potential of participatory 
constitution-making to provide a forum for negotiation and to begin a process of 
healing and reconciliation); Constitution-Making, supra note 5, at 156-57 (arguing 
that maintaining an open conversation in constitution-making deters renewed 
conflicts). 
16 Kirsh Samuels, State Building II: Issues of Design and Implementation: State-
112 U. Pa. ]. Int'l. L. [Vol. 29:1 
Efforts to make the constitution-making process more 
democratic have focused on ensuring that citizens have the 
opportunity to participate in the meetings, deliberations, 
discussions, or debates regarding the content of the constitution. 
The goal has been to decrease external exclusion- the ways in 
which individuals are prevented from participating in the decision-
making forums.t7 The assumption has been that increasing 
participation will facilitate the introduction and discussion of a 
variety of perspectives that will lead to innovative and effective 
governance systems, significant public support for the constitution, 
and domestic legitimacy for the state's governance system. 
Research on recent constitution-making processes in post-conflict 
and transitional states has found that more representative and 
more inclusive constitution-making processes resulted in 
constitutions that favored free and fair elections, greater political 
equality, more social justice provisions, human rights protections, 
and mechanisms for accountability.tB This study, conducted by the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 
examined twelve cases of constitution making during transitional 
moments from either civil conflict or authoritarian rule.19 
Building and the Political Transition After Conflict, 99 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 171, 
172 (2005). 
17 See YOUNG, supra note 6, at 55 (outlining the means by which individuals 
can be excluded). Mitigating external exclusion is an important task. As Doug 
McAdam has noted, "excluded groups, or challengers, face enormous obstacles in 
their efforts to advance group interests. Challengers are excluded from routine 
decision-making processes precisely because their bargaining position, relative to 
established polity members, is so weak." DOUG McADAM, POLmCAL PROCESS AND 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY, 1930-1970, at 40 (1982). 
1s Samuels, supra note 6, at 668. 
19 See id. (analyzing the twelve case studies covered in: CAROLYN McCooL, 
INT'L IDEA, THE ROLE OF CONSTmiTION-BUILDING PROCESSES IN DEMOCRATIZATION: 
AFGHANISTAN CASE STUDY {2004), A.A. MOHAMOUD, INT'L IDEA, THE ROLE OF 
CONSTITUTION-BUILDING PROCESSES IN DEMOCRATIZATION: BAHRAIN CASE STUDY 
{2005), J. EsTEBAN MONTES & ToMAs VIAL, INT'L IDEA, THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTION-
BUILDING PROCESSES IN DEMOCRATIZATION: CHILE CASE STUDY (2005), IVAN 
MARULANDA, INT'L IDEA, THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTION-BUILDING PROCESSES IN 
DEMOCRATIZATION: COLOMBIA CASE STUDY (2004), RANDALL GARRISON, INT'L IDEA, 
THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTION-BUILDING PROCESSES IN DEMOCRATIZATION: EAST TIMOR 
CASE STUDY (2005), }ILL COTTRELL & Y ASH GHAI, INT'L IDEA, THE ROLE OF 
CONSTITUTION-BUILDING PROCESSES IN DEMOCRATIZATION: FIJI CASE STUDY {2004), 
RODDY BRETI & ANTONIO DELGADO, INT'L IDEA, THE ROLE OF CONSTmiTION-
BUILDING PROCESSES IN DEMOCRATIZATION: GUATEMALA CASE STUDY (2004), ANDREA 
MEZEI, INT'L IDEA, THE ROLE OF CONSTmiTION-BUILDING PROCESSES IN 
DEMOCRATIZATION: HUNGARY CASE STUDY (2005), EDWARD SCHNEIER, INT'L IDEA, 
THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTION-BUILDING PROCESSES IN DEMOCRATIZATION: INDONESIA 
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Participatory processes were also found to broaden the 
constitutional agenda and prevent former combatants from 
dividing state power and resources amongst themselves.2o 
Constitutions that were created through constitution-making 
processes that were dominated by one interest or party favored the 
dominant interest or party. Those that resulted from elite pacts21 
undermined social and economic equality and "empowered actors 
for whom democracy was not a priority."22 Participatory 
CASE STUDY (2005), JILL COTTRELL & Y ASH GHAI, INT'L IDEA, THE ROLE OF 
CONSTITUTION-BUILDING PROCESSES IN DEMOCRATIZATION: KENYA CASE STUDY 
(2004), JOHN SIMPKINS, INT'L IDEA, THE ROLE OF CONSTmJTION-BUILDING PROCESSES 
IN DEMOCRATIZATION: NIGERIA CASE STUDY (EXTERNAL PERSPECTIVE) (2004), 
PRISCILLA YACHAT ANKUT, INT'L IDEA, THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTION-BUILDING 
PROCESSES IN DEMOCRATIZATION: RWANDA CASE STUDY (2005), all available at 
http:/ fwww. idea.int/conflict/cbp). 
2o See Samuels, supra note 6, at 670 (arguing that power should not be limited 
to elites and that more inclusive constitution-making increases the chance for 
sustainable democracy). 
21 An elite pact is an "explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, 
agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or, better, to 
redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees 
for the 'vital interests' of those entering into it." GUILLERMO O'DONNELL & 
PHILIPPE C. ScHMITTER, TRANSITIONS FROM AlTfHORITARIAN RULE: TENTATIVE 
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES 37 (1986). 
22 Samuels, supra note 6, at 669. See O'DONNELL & ScHMITTER, supra note 21, at 
42 (arguing that socioeconomic change can make it increasingly difficult for an 
elite cartel to maintain power). Peace agreement constitutions and political 
power-sharing agreements ensure that the negotiating parties will not be 
permanently excluded from political power or exposed to political abuse in the 
future. BARBARA F. WALTER, COMMmiNG TO PEACE: THE SUCCESSFUL SETTLEMENT OF 
CiVIL WARS 27-28 (2002); Caroline Hartzell & Matthew Hoddie, Institutionalizing 
Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 318, 
321 (2003). Unsurprisingly, such agreements rarely address issues or interests 
other than those important to the parties to the agreement. As such, democratic 
reforms are incorporated to the extent that they advance the interests of the 
negotiating combatants. The desire for domestic and international legitimacy can 
serve as an impetus for democratic reforms, but such reforms are likely to be 
restricted. For example, agreements may include provisions requiring elections at 
some point in the future, but they are rarely used to determine the participants in 
the first post-conflict government. See, e.g., Protocol Between the Government of 
Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on Power 
Sharing, art. 1.6.2.11, May 26, 2004 (expressing the right to vote); Political 
Negotiations on the Peace Process and on Transition in the DRC: Global and 
Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dec. 
16, 2002 at 3-5 (outlining plans for elections after the transitional period); Protocol 
of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the 
Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-
Based Transitional Government, arts. 48-63, Jan. 9, 1993 [hereinafter Rwanda 
Power-Sharing Agreement] (outlining the resolution of the war). But see General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 33 
114 U. Pa. J. Int'l. L. [Vol. 29:1 
constitution making also ·served an educational function. It 
provided an opportunity to initiate democratic education in 
societies that had little political freedom and few past 
opportunities for citizens to participate in shaping the state's 
governance framework.23 Insufficient attention, however, has been 
paid to internal exclusion and the role of institutional design 
decisions in creating or facilitating such exclusion.24 
In post-conflict states a significant barrier to effective 
participatory decisionmaking is exclusion. There are three 
components of participation that are relevant to a discussion of 
exclusion and participatory constitution making: attendance, 
contribution, and engagement.25 Attendance refers to whether or 
not individuals are physically present at the participatory forum. 
Attendance can be hindered despite rules allowing all members of 
the community to participate. Social conventions may require or 
suggest that only men, the educated, the well-off, or those 
appropriately dressed participate in such forums. Absent outreach 
work to address these social conventions, participation may be 
I.L.M. 75 (1996) (providing for elections in 1995 but supporting, if not indirectly 
guaranteeing, the electoral success of the nationalist parties). 
23 See Gianpaolo Baiocchi, Participation, Activism, and Politics: The Porto Alegre 
Experiment and Deliberative Democratic Theory, 29 POL. & Soc'y 43, 56-57 (2001) 
(discussing the bolstering effect of participatory governance on civil society in 
Brazil); Fung & Wright, supra note 12, at 29 (discussing evidence that participatory 
decision-making allowed ordinary citizens to gain political wisdom through 
experience rather than through the media); Samuels, supra note 6, at 669 (arguing 
that the participatory process of constitution-making empowered people who 
have not previously had the opportunity to shape the governance of their state in 
the past). 
24 Internal exclusion refers to the ways in which "people lack effective 
opportunity to influence the thinking of others even when they have access to fora 
and procedures of decision-making." YouNG, supra note 6, at 55. 
zs In discussing democratic debate, Young states: 
I prefer to call to the normal condition of democratic debate a process 
of struggle. In a society where there are social group differences and 
significant injustice, democratic politics ought to be a process of struggle. 
Far from a face-off in enemy opposition, struggle is a process of 
communicative engagement of citizens with one another. People of 
differing social positions or interests must struggle to raise issues 
because others may be threatened by those issues or they may simply 
think that different issues are more important. 
YOUNG, supra note 6, at 50. 
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low.26 Second, individuals may attend the participatory forum, but 
not contribute to the discussions. As with physical presence, 
participation could be constrained as a result of social conventions 
that address not only who can participate, but also how people 
should participate.27 Expressing different, dissenting, or 
conflicting opinions, thoughts, ideas, or proposals may be seen as 
inappropriate and result in social sanctions.2s Creating an 
environment in which dissent and conflict are accepted is a critical 
part of inclusive participatory processes. Finally, individuals may 
attend and contribute to the discussion even though their opinions, 
thoughts, ideas, or proposals are in tension with dominant cultural 
or political norms. Participants may, however, dismiss and not 
engage such contributions because they do not fit within an 
accepted conception of the common good or a common norm. 29 
Yet participatory communicative decisionmaking is premised on 
the idea that participants will advance proposals in ways that can 
persuade all participants. This requires rooting one's comments in 
an accepted notion of some common goods or norms. While 
participants are supposed to be open to considering reasons and 
justifications that conflict with their antecedent preferences and 
interests, it will be difficult for them to examine and reevaluate 
their conceptions of common goods or norms.3o Thus identifying 
26 See Archon Fung, Recipes for Public Spheres: Eight Institutional Design Choices 
and Their Consequences, 11 J. PoL. PHIL. 338, 347-48 (2003) (suggesting outreach 
work as a means of alleviating participation bias based on socioeconomic class). 
27 See infra text accompanying notes 159-65 for a discussion of the effect of 
social conventions on women's participation in Rwanda's national constitutional 
conference. 
28 Cf }ANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 295 (1983) ("When 
the assumption of common interest makes conflict illegitimate, a polity may no 
longer tolerate dissent."). 
29 See id. at 293-98; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DF5IGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT 
CONSTITUTIONS Do 26 (2001) (discussing social conformity and the mechanisms of 
group polarization); Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic 
Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTF5TING THE BOUNDARIF5 OF THE 
POLITICAL 67, 73 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) [hereinafter Toward a Deliberative 
Model] (arguing that deliberative democracy requires equal and symmetrical 
participation and the right to question both topics of conversation and discourse 
procedure). Limited attendance and limited contributions by those in attendance 
constrain the information available to participants and the types of arguments 
available for consideration. 
30 See Toward a Deliberative Model, supra note 29, at 71 (stating that the 
challenge to democratic rationality is arriving at a common good despite 
inevitable societal value-pluralism); Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in 
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and working with prevailing conceptions of common goods and 
norms become important aspects of communicating effectively 
within participatory forums.31 
The framers of participatory constitution-making processes 
generally work to limit exclusion in the first two components of 
participation: attendance and contribution. Outreach work is 
often undertaken by local government, non-governmental 
organizations, inter-governmental organizations, and local social 
movement organizations to encourage citizens to attend and 
contribute during the participatory forums.32 Less work, however, 
is put toward addressing the lack of engagement experienced by 
many individuals and organizations. Minimal engagement in 
Rwanda appears to be one of the more significant ways in which 
individuals and organizations were denied an opportunity to 
influence the LCC deliberations.33 
2.1. External and Internal Participatory Systems 
Analytically it is useful to distinguish amongst the various 
participatory constitution-making systems currently being utilized. 
Recent efforts to include the public in constitution-making 
Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE 
BOUNDARIFS OF THE POLmCAL 95, 100 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996). 
3t See infra Section 3 (discussing framing and the importance of SMOs using 
frames that resonate with relevant decision-makers and the broader public). 
32 Social movement organizations can similarly play a role in mitigating 
exclusion that results from a failure to engage. They can mobilize, organize, and 
strategically frame their arguments, ideas, and proposals in ways that are 
congruent with dominant conceptions of the common good or common norms. 
Such framing enables the arguments, ideas, or proposals to be critically engaged 
within the participatory forums of the constitution-making process. 
There may in fact be times in which particular segments of a society are 
interested in advancing ideas and proposals that cannot be linked to any aspect of 
dominant conceptions of the common good or common norms. In such cases, 
strategic framing will not be useful. It is my contention, however, that social 
movement organizations seeking to deepen democratic reforms in post-conflict 
states will in fact be able to link their goals to dominant conceptions of common 
norms or a common good. Norms regarding equality, justice, and freedom are 
prevalent, in great part as a result of the diffusion of international human rights 
norms. Conflicts regarding the implementation of such norms will exist and they 
will manifest themselves differently in different societies. It is for these types of 
conflicts that social movement organizations can utilize strategic framing to 
facilitate engagement within participatory forums to assist in the resolution of 
such conflicts. 
33 See text accompanying notes 60-64 (discussing the limited number of 
public comments reviewed by the LCC). 
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processes have employed various combinations of the following 
three-stage process, which focuses on addressing external 
exclusion. First, the government arranges public meetings 
throughout the country in which individuals discuss what they 
believe the current political system does well, explain their 
concerns with the current political system, identify new matters for 
the constitution to address, and develop innovative ideas for 
addressing the concerns and new matters that have been raised. 
Second, a national committee or commission reviews the feedback 
received during the consultation process and drafts a new 
constitution. Third, the draft constitution is put to a national 
referendum for approval. Each stage provides for different types 
of participation in terms of quantity and quality. Institutional 
design decisions regarding which stages to utilize and how to 
implement them influence the capacity of individuals and 
organizations to experience internal inclusion. 
The ability of participatory constitution making to achieve the 
normative and instrumental goals its adherents articulate varies 
based on the modes of participation provided, the method by 
which the drafters are selected, the manner in which the drafting 
body makes decisions, and how the public information is utilized 
in the drafting process. Participatory constitution-making systems 
as a category address external exclusion, but they vary in the 
extent to which they facilitate internal inclusion due to process 
design choices regarding the above-noted factors. 
The typology of participatory constitution-making systems 
introduced below assists in better analyzing the effects of utilizing 
participatory constitution making in post-conflict states. Based on 
the importance of facilitating internal inclusion, there are two 
broad categories of participatory systems: external participatory 
systems and internal participatory systems.34 External 
34 Rwanda provides a good case for examining constitution-making in Africa 
because the Rwandan process mirrors the most frequent type of participatory 
process utilized in Africa. The key features of that process are that the drafting 
body has fewer than fifteen key decision-makers, the members of the drafting 
body are appointed by the government, a national approval referendum is held, 
and there are no initial negotiations to create the constitution-making process. See 
JENNIFER WIDNER, CONSTITUTION WRITING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 10, 12 (U.N. 
Univ. World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Research ed., 2005), available at 
http:/ jwww.wider.unu.edu/publications/rps/rps2005/rp2005-51.pdf 
(explaining the styles of participation utilized by different countries and regions). 
Twenty-four of the eighty-four African countries reviewed utilized this type of 
participatory process. I d. Rwanda's process is also representative of other 
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participatory systems exclude the public from the forums in which 
substantive decisions about the constitution are made, but allow 
the public to interact with the drafting body in a consultative 
capacity. This is often accomplished through public meetings and 
written submissions. Internal participatory systems include 
citizens in the substantive decision-making forums directly or 
through representatives, and the agenda-setting and decision-
making rules facilitate the review and consideration of a wide 
variety of proposals. 
External participatory systems are also characterized by a 
predominant focus on gathering support for, and increasing the 
legitimacy of, a specific governance system. In such systems 
political elites envisage a particular governance system, and they 
consult the public in an effort to gain support for their vision. The 
public consultation process is likely to involve a significant amount 
of civic education and information about the benefits and 
disadvantages of various constitutional options. The process will 
also enable individuals to discuss concerns and offer ideas or 
proposals. The level of openness to such recommendations or 
proposals will depend upon how they fit with the governance 
system envisioned by the elite. In internal participatory systems 
political elites seek public involvement in creating the governance 
system. Public participation facilitates the development of a 
national consensus for a set of principles and practices regarding 
political participation and resolving political, economic, and social 
conflicts. External participatory systems focus on obtaining 
support for an elite-designed governance system while internal 
systems seek to engage the public in creating that system. 
These goals influence the institutional and procedural choices 
made when designing and implementing a participatory system 
for constitution making. In external systems political elites 
maintain control over access to the drafting body and information 
regarding the process. Such control is often exercised by creating a 
drafting body comprised of representatives of specific interests 
within the country deemed important by the government, 
appointing members of the drafting body, and providing general 
processes in Africa because of the extensive public consultation with ordinary 
people that took place during the preparation of the draft. Widner finds that 
43.2% of the African countries reviewed consulted the public during the 
preparation of the initial draft and 41.3% of such countries provided opportunities 
for ordinary citizens to participate. Id. at 12-13. 
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rather than specific information to the public about substantive 
developments in the process. Citizen participation is channeled 
toward consultative activities such as public meetings, which serve 
two purposes. First, public meetings enable government officials 
to educate the public about the role of a constitution and the 
governance options available. Second, they provide an 
opportunity for individuals to share their ideas, grievances, or 
proposals with the members of the drafting body and fellow 
participants. These modes of participation convey the 
government's interest in citizen opinions, which is an important 
development in a state's democratization process.3s Despite 
widespread public consultation being a critical aspect of external 
participatory systems, there are few rules or procedures governing 
how the drafting body should review and consider the information 
received from the public. For example, Rwanda's Legal and 
Constitutional Commission ("LCC") issued an action plan in which 
it stated its intention to create a database cataloging individual 
responses to the LCC-issued questionnaire. The database, 
however, was only to include seven percent of the returned 
questionnaires selected at random. 36 The internal LCC rules 
required the LCC members to consult the public and gather ideas 
about the type of constitution that would best suit the country, but 
the rules only required the members to furnish reports about their 
individual participation in public consultation forums.37 There are 
no guidelines for recording ideas or proposals offered during the 
public meetings or for reviewing them and presenting them to the 
LCC as a whole.38 
35 Many post-conflict states have long histories with authoritarian regimes in 
which citizen concerns and opinions were disregarded. See, e.g., CLAUDE AKE, 
DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 4-5 (1996) (explaining how African 
countries transitioning to post-colonial authority failed to empower common 
citizens). 
36 REPUBLIC OF RWANDA LEGAL & CONST. COMM'N, TOWARDS A CONSTITUTION 
FOR RWANDA: ACTION PLAN 2002-2003, at 15 (Apr. 2002) [hereinafter ACTION 
PLAN]. 
37 REPUBLIC OF RWANDA LEGAL & CONST. COMM'N, INTERNAL RULES FOR THE 
LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION art. 9 (Mar. 21, 2001). 
38 The focus on legitimacy and support in external participatory systems is 
exemplified in the requirement that LCC members are to defend the positions of 
the LCC. Id. Rather than engage in critical discussions with the public and 
amongst themselves about the elite-created governance system in an effort to 
create the most effective system for the society as a whole, LCC members were 
required to defend it. 
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In what I term internal participatory systems, there is a broadly 
representative drafting body representing all citizens within the 
state. The representatives to this body are freely chosen by their 
constituents. There are mechanisms for the representatives to 
ascertain the ideas, grievances, or proposals of their constituents 
and be accountable to them. The process also facilitates public 
dialogue amongst citizens and between citizens and members of 
the drafting body. Finally, rules regulate how the drafting body 
responds to proposals from citizens. This type of system enables 
more citizens to contribute to the substantive discussions and 
deliberations regarding the constitution. Rather than seeking mere 
public support for an elite-created governance system, internal 
participatory systems seek to give individuals residing in a post-
conflict state the opportunity to influence the substance of the 
constitution.39 
2.2. Participatory Constitution Making in Rwanda 
On December 13, 1999, Rwanda's Transitional National 
Assembly ("TNA") enacted legislation creating the Legal and 
Constitutional Commission. The LCC was tasked with preparing a 
draft constitution, drafting bills for laws to govern during the 
transition period, and reconciling all laws with the new 
constitution. In undertaking these tasks the LCC was to obtain the 
views of the population, make use of examples from other 
countries, and explain what a constitution is to the general 
population. 40 Rwanda's constitutional review process was initially 
proposed in the 1993 Arusha Peace Agreement (" AP A" or "Arusha 
Agreement"), which was negotiated to end the armed conflict in 
Rwanda that had begun in October 1990 when fifty members of the 
Rwandan Patriotic Army crossed into Rwanda from Uganda near 
39 See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 6, at 5-6 ("The normative legitimacy of a 
democratic decision depends on the degree to which those affected by it have 
been included in the decision-making processes and have had the opportunity to 
influence the outcomes."); Lani Guinier, More Democracy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 
16 (1995) ("Democracy is about participating. Participation matters. It matters 
because the decisions that governments make affect everyone. Respect for those 
decisions, including those with which we disagree, demands meaningful 
participation in the decision making process."). 
40 See AcrroN PLAN, supra note 36, at 3 (laying out the initial charge of the 
Legal and Conscrutional Commission); Republic of Rwanda Legal & Canst. 
Cornm'n, Our Mission and Objectives, http:/ /W.VW.cjcr.gov.rwjeng/mission.htrn 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2007) (outlining Commission objectives). 
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Kagitumba and opened fire on Rwandan border guards. 41 The 
APA was never fully implemented before the Spring 1994 genocide 
in which approximately 800,000 individuals were killed.42 When 
the Rwandan Patriotic Army successfully ended the genocide and 
took control of the state's government, it decided to implement the 
APA.43 
The LCC had twelve commissioners who were elected by the 
Transitional National Assembly.44 Eight members represented the 
eight officially registered political parties, one represented the 
army and national police, two represented civil society, and one 
represented the private sector.4S The composition of the TNA was 
based on the Arusha Agreement, which gave each of the then-
existing political parties and the military a set number of seats. 
Each party was responsible for appointing its own TNA 
Deputies. 46 The LCC was a mirror of the political interests 
represented in the negotiated legislative body.47 
41 See GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS 1959-1994: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 
93 (1995) (describing the attack that marked the beginning of the civil war in 
Rwanda). 
42 I d. at 265. 
43 A modified version of the Arusha Peace Agreement (" APA") was 
implemented. Provisions providing for the political participation of the 
Mouvement Republicain National pour Ia Democratie et le Diveloppement (National 
Republican Movement for Democracy and Development) ("MRND"), former 
President Habyarimana's party, were not implemented. 
44 The TNA selected the twelve members from a slate of fifteen candidates. 
See Republic of Rwanda Legal & Const. Comm'n, About Our Commission, 
http:/ /www.cjcr.gov.rwjeng/about.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2007). 
45 See NATL UNITY & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
SUMMIT ON UNITY & RECONCILIATION 52 (2002), available at http:/ jwww.grandslacs 
.net/ docj2998.pdf (hereinafter UNITY & RECONCILIATION REPORT]. 
46 Rwanda Power-Sharing Agreement, supra note 22, art. 60. 
47 The APA distributed Transitional National Assembly ("TNA") seats to the 
MRND, which were redistributed amongst the remaining political parties after 
the genocide when the Rwandese Patriotic Front ("RPF") assumed control of the 
government. At the time the APA was negotiated the various political parties had 
been in existence for several years, but they had yet to stand for an election. 
Commentators on Rwandan politics have described the parties as '"democrats' 
who were not always of the purest type, but who had the support of a large 
segment of the population for whom democracy meant peace, an end to political 
corruption, financial accountability by the government and freedom of 
expression." PRUNIER, supra note 41, at 133. Others have noted that "[i]t is clear 
that only the parties who were willing allies of the ruling RPF could make the 
final shortlist for the Constitutional Commission's membership." ANKlJf, supra 
note 7, at 16. 
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The LCC adopted internal rules of practice and procedure and 
developed an action plan to implement its mandate. The LCC' s 
early tasks included meeting with governance experts throughout 
the world and participating in a conference on constitutional 
Political turmoil in Rwanda began before the October 1990 armed attacks by 
the RPF. By July 1990, President Habyarimana was facing considerable domestic 
and international pressure to open up the political system, which he and his party, 
the MRND, had controlled since 1973. See ALISON OFS FORGES, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 47 (1999), available 
at http:/ jwww.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/index.htm [hereinafter LEAVE 
NONE TO TELL THE STORY] (describing the pressure from various sources for 
political and economic reforms). In June 1991 President Habyarimana accepted a 
constitutional amendment that made multiple political parties legal. He 
eventually agreed to incorporate the major opposition parties into a coalition 
government. The parties in that coalition government were the MRND, the 
Mouvement Democratique Republicain (Democratic Republican Movement) 
("MDR"), the Parti Social Democrate (Social Democratic Party) ("PSD"), the Parti 
Liberal (Liberal Party) ("PL"), and the Parti Democratique Chretien (Christian 
Democratic Party) ("PDC"). Id. at 52. 
Several months after the coalition government was formed, the United States 
and France orchestrated peace talks between the Rwandan Government and the 
RPF, which were conducted by the Organization of African Unity. The talks 
continued through July 1993 and the Arusha Accords were signed on August 4, 
1993. President Habyarimana was stripped of the majority of his presidential 
powers as a result of the power-sharing arrangement that called for the creation of 
the Broad-Based Transitional Government ("BBTG"). The BBTG was to consist of 
the RPF, the MRND, the MDR, the PSD, the PL, and the PDC. Within the 
executive branch Habyarimana remained President and Faustin Twagiramungu 
of the MDR became the Prime Minister. The MRND and the RPF each received 
five portfolios, the MDR four portfolios, the PSD and the PL three portfolios each, 
and one portfolio for the PDC. See Rwanda Power-Sharing Agreement, supra note 
22, art. 55 (discussing portfolios which refer to state ministries like foreign affairs, 
education, or defense). The seventy-member Transitional National Assembly was 
divided to give the MRND, RPF, MDR, PSD, and PL eleven seats each, the PDC 
four seats, and one seat to other registered parties. Id. art. 62. Registered political 
parties had to sign a political code of conduct pledge. 
Efforts to implement the Arusha Peace Agreement faltered and eventually 
collapsed in April1994 after Habyarimana died in a plane crash and the genocide 
of more than 1 million Tutsi and moderate Hutu. See Gilbert M. Khadiagala, 
Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda, in ENDING CIVIL WARS: THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACE AGREEMENTS 463 (Stephen John Stedman et al. eds., 
2002) (describing the collapse of efforts to implement the APA). The genocide 
took place over the course of three months and ended in July 1994 when the RPF 
military forces, the Rwandan Patriotic Army ("RPA"), took Kigali, the capital of 
Rwanda. The RPF set up an interim government, the Government of National 
Unity ("GNU"), with ministers that had been previously selected for the BBTG 
with the exception of the MRND representatives. A national assembly was also 
formed with representatives from the RPF, MDR, PSD, PL, PDC, Parti 
Democratique Islamique (Islamic Democratic Party), Parti Socialiste Rwandais 
(Rwandcse Socialist Party), the Union Democratique du Peuple Rwandais 
(Democratic Union of the Rwandese People), and the RPA. 
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development attended by constitutional experts.48 Before moving 
into the public consultation phase of the process, the LCC created a 
booklet entitled Fundamental Ideas on a Constitution.49 This 
document provided information on the role of a constitution in 
addressing five categories of issues: political power, social 
problems, economic matters, human rights, and other matters. 
Examples are provided from different countries and questions 
specifically relevant to Rwanda are posed. For example, the 
section on political power outlines three types of political regimes: 
a presidential system offering the United States as an example, a 
parliamentary system describing England and Ethiopia, and a 
mixed or semi-presidential system providing France and Mali as 
examples. so The publication was intended to provide Rwandan 
citizens with information that would enable them to participate in 
public discussions about the constitution, offer proposals, and 
determine whether the final constitution was suitable.sl 
Based on this document, the LCC prepared a handbook for 
commissioners and other officials involved in facilitating the public 
meetings. The Education and Awareness Manual on Constitutional 
Matters is a condensed version of the Fundamental Ideas on a 
Constitution.sz This handbook is divided into two sections with the 
first section outlining the necessary features of a constitution and 
providing examples from other countries. The second section 
outlines Rwanda's constitutional history and Rwanda-specific 
problems, such as the genocide, that the new constitution must 
acknowledge and resolve.s3 This second section identifies divisive 
politics as a significant factor contributing to the genocide and 
notes that to resolve the problems that caused the genocide, the 
48 REPUBLIC OF RWANDA LEGAL & CONST. COMM'N, CONFERENCE ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROCEEDINGS (Aug. 19-24, 2001) (on file with 
author). 
49 Republic of Rwanda Legal & Const. Comm'n, Les Idees Fondamentales d'une 
Constitution [Fundamental Ideas on a Constitution], http:/ jwww.cjcr.gov.rw j 
idees. pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2007). 
so Id. at 20-28. 
51 Id. at 2. 
52 Republic of Rwanda Legal & Const. Comm'n, Module de Fonnation et de 
Sensibilisation en Matiere Consitutionnelle [Education and Awareness Manual on 
Constitutional Matters], http:/ jwww.cjcr.gov.rwjmodule.htm (last visited Oct. 
22, 2007) [hereinafter Module de Fonnation et de Sensibilisation]. 
53 Id. 
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country needs good governance,54 justice, unity and reconciliation, 
Rwandan participation in public life, a state founded upon respect 
for human rights, and responsible political parties. 55 
This handbook was used at the district level meetings that were 
held throughout the country between January and June 2002.56 
The session facilitators explained the role of a constitution within a 
society and matters such as the various options available for 
organizing political power and protecting civil, political, and social 
rights.57 The LCC reported that turnout at the meetings averaged 
90,000 people. 58 LCC literature states that discussions on a specific 
topic at a meeting were closed when an opinion was agreed upon 
by all present or, in the absence of total agreement, when a 
majority agreed as determined by a vote. It appears that dissenting 
views were to be noted "so as to be discussed" at a later time.59 
The LCC also developed a sixty-item questionnaire covering 
issues that the LCC saw as potentially controversial, such as land 
issues, marriage, and divorce. The questionnaire was given to 
citizens for completion and group discussions facilitated by the 
LCC were used to gather the opinions of the illiterate portions of 
54 The factors giving rise to good governance are identified as governance 
founded on public participation, a government in which citizens chose their 
representatives, transparent governance, adherence to the rule of law, and 
governance founded on the equality of all citizens. Id. at *24-*25. 
55 Id. at *24-*26, The section on political parties specifically states: 
Political parties should, in their own way, rectify or change the bad 
behaviour attributed to them by the population; the parties must disclose 
their political beliefs and the real platform that shows how they will 
contribute to solving the country's problems; the parties must avoid 
sowing the seeds of divisionism among Rwandans; the parties must 
accept that electoral defeat will not be a source of insecurity or the 
destruction of the country; the behaviour of party leaders should set an 
example to their members and all Rwandans. 
INT'L CRISIS GROUP, RWANDA AT THE END OF THE TRANSITION: A NECESSARY 
POLITICAL LmERALISATION 7 (2002), available at http:/ /www.crisisgroup.org/ 
library/ documents/ report_archive/ A400817 _13112002. pdf (translating Module de 
Formation et de Sensibilisation, supra note 52, at *24). 
56 The Commission Started Gathering Views, supra note 2. 
57 Module de Formation et de Sensibilisation, supra note 52; see also ANKUT, supra 
note 7, at 17 (describing the process of facilitating public discussion about societal 
issues in a constitutional framework). 
58 ACTION PLAN, supra. note 36, at 8. 
59 Cf The Commission Started Gathering Views, supra note 2 (noting that the 
Commission will take into account minority and individual views). 
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the population. 60 The LCC pooled the questionnaire responses and 
sorted them. 6t Each answer was graded "according to pertinence 
and where it came from (an individual person, a group of persons, 
an expert in a specific area, an institution or a department [])."62 
After cross-checking the accuracy of the public's feedback, the LCC 
began drafting the constitution. In September 2002, the LCC 
issued a booklet presenting a summary of the information gathered 
during the LCC' s consultation with the public. 63 The foreword to 
the publication states that it "was prepared with the help of ideas 
contributed by all citizens. Its publication is a deliberate intention 
to present to all people their constitution ideas after analysing 
them. Most of the ideas are those contributed by the majority."64 
The LCC prepared a draft constitution that it presented to a 
select group of individuals at a three-day national conference in 
November 2002.65 The conference is reported to have been 
attended by 500 to 800 individuals. These individuals were 
selected for different purposes; some were international experts 
whose participation was to ensure that the draft constitution 
conformed to international standards, while others represented 
specific interests within Rwandan society.66 Subsequent drafts 
were circulated in December 2002 and February 2003. The 
February 2003 draft was presented to the Council of Ministers and 
the TNA. Various parliamentary committees discussed the draft 
60 See ANKUT, supra note 7, at 16-17 (detailing LCC Chair Tito Rutaremara's 
description of the process). 
61 AcriON PLAN, supra note 36, at 15. It is unclear exactly how many 
questionnaires were coded, but the 2002-2003 Action Plan anticipated randomly 
selecting seven percent of the questionnaires to review. 
62 UNITY & RECONCILIATION REPORT, supra note 45, at 53. 
63 Republic of Rwanda Legal & Canst. Cornm'n, Fundamental Ideas on the New 
Constitution (Sept. 2002), http://www .cjcr.gov.rw I eng/ fundamentalldeas.doc 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2007) [hereinafter Fundamental Ideas Report]. 
64 Id. at 1. 
65 ANKUT, supra note 7, at 18; c.f U.N. Dev. Fund for Women [UNIFEM], 
UNIFEM Action and Analysis, in Issue Brief on Justice (Nov. 2002), 
http:/ /www.womenwarpeace.org/Portals/O/Documents/justice_archive.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2007) [hereinafter UNIFEM Justice Brief] (recognizing the 
inclusion of women at November's national drafting conference). 
66 The Rwandan government selected the participants for this national 
conference. See ANKUT, supra note 7, at 18; see also UNIFEM Justice Brief, supra 
note 65 ("In November 2002, the government called a national conference to 
review the draft constitution. At this time, UNIFEM successfully lobbied for the 
increase of the percentage of women at the conference to be increased from 6% to 
20%."). 
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constitution with the LCC in March 2003 and a parliamentary 
debate was held in April 2003.67 The TNA amended the draft, 
which the LCC presented to the public during a televised and 
radio-broadcasted town meeting on May 18, 2003.68 The 
referendum was held on May 26, 2003, and was overwhelmingly 
approved by 93.4% of the voters. 69 Eighty-seven percent of the 
population participated in the referendum. 70 The Supreme Court 
approved the new constitution on June 2, 2003, and President 
Kagame signed it on June 4, 2003.71 
The participatory system utilized in Rwanda did not allow 
citizens to participate in the substantive drafting deliberations 
directly or through freely chosen representatives. Those sessions 
were limited to LCC members, who were selected by an appointed 
legislative body. The LCC mirrored the delicate political balance 
of the TNA and its members were political allies of the Rwandese 
Patriotic Front ("RPF"),72 In contrast to internal participatory 
systems, citizens attempting to participate in an external 
participatory system must have an ally on the drafting committee, 
someone who is able and willing to promote their ideas and 
advocate their positions during the drafting deliberations. This can 
be a hard relationship to develop when the members of the 
drafting body are not mandated to advance the interests of any 
particular segment of the society. In Rwanda, the LCC members 
were selected to represent the broad categories of civil society, the 
private sector, and the political interests of political parties that had 
no firmly established constituents. 73 Citizens did not have a 
67 ANKUT, supra note 7, at 18. 
68 See Republic of Rwanda Legal & Const. Comrn' n, Le President de Ia 
Republique a Promulgue Ia Nouvelle Constitution [The President of the Republic 
Approved the New Constitution) Oune 4, 2003) http:/ jwww.cjcr.gov.rw/ 
actualite015.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2007) [hereinafter Nouvelle Constitution) 
(mentioning the participatory structure in the constitution-making process); 
Republic of Rwanda Legal & Const. Comrn'n, Current Status of the Commission 
(May 18, 2003), http:/ jwww.cjcr.gov.rwjeng/newsOOS.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 
2007) ("On Sunday 18th may [sic] 2003 members of the Legal and Constitutional 
Commission conducted a live talk show on the national TV and radio."). 
69 Nouvelle Constitution, supra note 68. 
7o Id. 
n Id. 
72 See ANKUT, supra note 7, at 16 (noting that only "willing allies" of the RPF 
were ultimately granted membership to the Constitutional Commission). 
73 See infra text accompanying note 79 (discussing the development of 
Rwandan political parties and noting that these parties had never stood for an 
election). 
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specific drafting body member responsible for representing their 
interests in the way that they do when the drafting body is an 
elected assembly. The LCC encouraged citizens to approach the 
LCC as a single entity accessible to all rather than to seek out 
specific representatives for particular interests. For example, the 
LCC website invited citizens to direct their comments to the 
President, Vice President, and Executive Secretary of the LCC 
rather than directing civil society matters to the civil society 
representatives or military issues to the army and national police 
representative. 74 
While citizens generally face challenges getting legislative 
representatives to advance their specific interests or proposals, 
most citizens in an external participatory system have no dedicated 
representative. They are left to convince one or more of the 
appointed drafters that their interests and concerns are worth 
advancing or that they have a responsibility to do so. Women's 
organizations in Rwanda were successful at this task, but it 
entailed mobilizing gender equity advocates,75 developing and 
implementing an effective framing strategy, and obtaining 
influential allies. This required framing their claims for 
constitutionally protected political participation rights for women 
in a way that was consistent with the LCC's and RPF's governance 
frames. 
Incorporating the ideas of the citizenry to make the constitution 
a "common denominator" amongst all citizens is common rhetoric 
for government officials utilizing participatory constitution 
making.76 Yet, as discussed in Section 2.1, the immediate goal of 
74 This strategy is in no doubt related to the RPF' s anxiety about the political 
representation of specific interests. See infra text accompanying note 191 
(expressing Paul Kagame's concerns about localized elections and the strong 
ethnic identities of political parties in Rwanda). 
75 Mobilization is "(t]he process by which a group goes from being a passive 
collection of individuals to an active participant in public life." OICfiONARY OF 
SoCIOLOGY 420 Gohn Scott & Gordon Marshall eds., 3d ed. 2005). 
76 See, e.g., The Commission Started Gathering Views, supra note 2 (reporting that 
LCC President Rutaremara "emphasized that views of each Rwandan are vital so 
as that constitution will be a common denominator of all Rwandans."); accord Give 
Us Your Suggestions, supra note 2 ("In order to establish the Constitution that suits 
all Rwandans, we call upon every person who will go on this site internet (sic] to 
give advice and views which will be considered while elaborating the 
Constitution."); cf Ahmed Issack Hassan, Introductory Document on the Whole 
Process (Sept. 15, 2001) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Law) (discussing means by which the voices of Kenyan citizens were 
incorporated in the constitutional review process in Kenya). 
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most officials is to obtain support for a specific governance system 
and have it deemed legitimate domestically and internationally. 
The fragility of the new democratic institutions, the nascent civil 
society, and the uncertainty over the goals of other communities or 
political organizations within the state induce anxiety about 
releasing total control to the citizenry to create the state's new 
governance system. Thus external participatory systems are more 
likely to be implemented. Such systems, however, pay insufficient 
attention to one of the most important instrumental benefits of 
participatory decisionmaking- developing a national consensus 
for a set of governance principles and practices. This benefit 
requires that citizens either participate in (directly or via 
representatives) or contribute to the discussions and deliberations 
in which substantive decisions about the constitution are made. 
Realizing this benefit requires the use of internal participatory 
systems. 
2.3. Exclusion in Rwanda 
Rwanda's participatory system for constitution making 
emphasized widespread consultation rather than inclusive 
deliberation. Consequently, only the ideas, concerns, and 
proposals of select interests within the society were seriously 
discussed and deliberated by the LCC. The deliberative aspects of 
participatory democratic theory suggest that deliberative forums in 
which individuals exchange and challenge ideas and proposals 
regarding a state's constitution with the use of arguments, 
narratives, greetings, or rhetoric will enable drafters to identify the 
most appropriate and effective constitutional provisions for 
creating an inclusive governance system. This process took place 
in Rwanda but the breadth of interests, groups, and societal 
segments participating was much narrower than that advocated by 
deliberative and participatory democratic political theorists.?? 
One of the essential ideas within deliberative and participatory 
democratic theory is that those who will be affected by a decision 
should participate in the decision-making process.7S Yet the 
forums in which substantive decisions about the constitution were 
made- the LCC meetings- were limited to LCC members. This 
body comprised individuals selected to represent the eight political 
77 See Banks, supra note 13. 
78 See, e.g., Young, supra note 6, at 5-6; Guinier, supra note 39, at 16. 
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parties, the military and national police, civil society, and the 
private sector. Citizens did not participate in designing the 
constitutional review process or the process for selecting the 
individuals that would draft the constitution. Both tasks were 
undertaken by the TNA, whose members were representatives of 
political parties that came into existence in 1991 but had never 
stood for an election. 79 
Widespread citizen participation was channeled toward public 
meetings where citizens were educated about constitutions, given 
the opportunity to share their opinions, and informed that they 
could submit written comments and proposals to the LCC. Certain 
citizens had the opportunity to participate in a national conference 
to review an early draft of the constitution.8o Finally, there was a 
national referendum for citizens to approve or reject the 
constitution. 
Despite statements from government officials indicating that 
the consultative process would "arouse discussions from which 
constructive views on the constitution will be [drawn]" and would 
include debates on matters such as the role of political parties after 
the transition, public opinion was incorporated based on its 
prevalence and relevance. 81 A grading system was used to analyze 
a portion of the feedback received, perhaps as little as seven 
percent. 82 Expert opinions on a specific issue received two points, 
opinions offered by interest groups received three points, and 
detailed memoranda presented by groups received four points. 83 
The ideas, concepts, and proposals incorporated in the constitution 
are reported to be those that "prevailed over the rest, by their 
number and their pertinence."84 
79 PRUNIER, supra note 41, at 122, 124-25. The TNA created the LCC, selected 
thirteen of fifteen candidates to be the LCC members, and designed the 
constitution review and drafting process. 
so Reports indicate that between 500 and 800 individuals took part in this 
conference. ANKUT, supra note 7, at 18; see also UNIFEM Justice Brief, supra note 65 
(discussing the participation of the Forum of Rwandan Women in the national 
conference to review the drafted constitution). 
81 The Commission Started Gathering Views, supra note 2; ANKUT, supra note 7, 
at 14. 
82 ACTION PLAN, supra note 36, at 15 (specifying that seven percent of the 
feedback received from regional questionnaires would be randomly selected for 
analysis). 
83 See ANKUT, supra note 7, at 18 (describing the process of assigning point 
values to feedback received from various sources). 
84 UNITY & RECONCILIATION REPORT, supra note 45, at 55. 
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Rwandan citizens had direct access to the constitution drafters 
but unlike cases in which a national assembly is convened to draft 
the constitution, citizens did not have appointed representatives 
within the LCC. When the drafting body met to discuss, 
deliberate, and draft, the only citizens whose proposals were 
considered were those who successfully mobilized to submit a 
detailed memorandum as a group and obtained an advocate 
within the drafting body. Citizens interested in influencing the 
substance of the new constitution had to devise strategies for 
obtaining the attention and support of the drafters.ss The 
organizing efforts of gender equity advocates suggest the elements 
of a successful strategy- mobilizing, cultivating influential allies, 
and framing proposals in ways that are consistent with the 
governance frames of the country's political elites. 86 
3. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CONSTITUTION MAKING 
Participatory constitution making in post-conflict states is part 
of a larger effort to create a democratic state. It provides an 
opportunity for excluded groups to solidify their political 
participation through legal guarantees. Taking advantage of that 
opportunity requires significantly more than submitting proposals 
or recommendations to the constitution-drafting body. 
Adopting the conception of political power outlined in Doug 
McAdam's political process theory, political power in post-conflict 
states is concentrated in the hands of a few, and most individuals 
within the society are deprived of the opportunity to influence 
major decisions affecting their lives. 87 This power, however, is not 
85 Processes that utilize national assemblies enable a potentially wide range 
of citizens to have advocates participating in the drafting process because citizens 
elect the members and there are hundreds of participants. The power or strength 
of the representatives will undoubtedly vary considerably, which will require 
citizens to devise strategies for obtaining the support of other citizens and their 
representatives. 
86 I would not expect these strategies to be of trivial importance in internal 
participatory systems, but they would not be necessary for individuals and 
organizations to access the forums in which substantive decision-making occurs. 
A key distinction between external and internal systems is the degree to which the 
drafting body is regulated in how it reviews and considers public-derived 
proposals and recommendations. When this process is completely unregulated, 
mobilizing, obtaining allies, and strategic framing become necessary for obtaining 
access to the substantive decision-making forums. When the process is regulated, 
these strategies can be useful in persuading decision makers or fellow citizens, but 
they are not necessary for achieving internal inclusion. 
87 MCADAM, supra note 17, at 36. 
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absolute. Political elites do not exercise "virtually unlimited power 
in politico-economic matters" rendering excluded groups 
functionally powerless.ss Most groups within post-conflict states 
have some "latent politicalleverage."89 Exercising that leverage is 
often hampered by a failure to recognize its existence. As noted by 
McAdam, "mass political impotence may as frequently stem from 
shared perceptions of powerlessness as from any objective inability 
to mobilize significant politicalleverage."90 
Successful attempts by excluded members of society to obtain 
political, economic, or social inclusion is related to political 
opportunities that are made available by elites, recognition by the 
excluded of their transformative power, and framing their reform 
proposals in ways that resonate with political elites and the public 
at large. Participatory constitution making offers a new political 
opportunity, but it is an opportunity within a context of 
conservative elite control. According to Charles Tilly this 
conservatism encourages elites to "resist changes which would 
threaten their current realization of their interests even more than 
they seek changes which would enhance their interests."91 
Further, they 
fight tenaciously against loss of power, and especially 
against expulsion from the polity. They work against 
admission to the polity of groups whose interests conflict 
significantly with their own. 
Existing members tend to be more exacting in their 
demands of contenders whose very admission would 
challenge the system in some serious way.92 
88 Id. at 37. 
89 See id. (noting that excluded groups' political leverage "comes from the 
'structural power' that their location in various politico-economic structures 
affords them"). 
90 ld. at 37-38; see also KURT ScHOCK, UNARMED INSURRECTIONS: PEOPLE POWER 
MOVEMENTS IN NONDEMOCRACIES 27 (2005) ("For the oppressed to engage in 
collective action, there must first be cognitive liberation, that is, a diminution of 
fatalism coupled with a perception that conditions are unjust, yet subject to 
change through collective action."). 
91 CHARLES TILLY, FROM MOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION 135 (1978) [hereinafter 
MOBILIZATION]. 
92 Id. 
132 U. Pa. J. Int'l. L. [Vol. 29:1 
This approach not ·only applies to individuals and 
organizations advocating goals contrary to the interests of the 
political elites, but it also applies to those with moderate goals 
"who simply pressure for membership in the competitive 
establislunent. For any change in the makeup of the polity is 
inherently disruptive of the institutionalized status quo and thus 
something to be resisted."93 
Rwanda's constitution-making experience suggests that the use 
of participatory constitution making does not eradicate political 
elite conservatism, rather it highlights the conservatism. Excluded 
groups can use participatory constitution-making processes to 
obtain greater political, economic, and social inclusion, but only 
when they engage in sustained and highly coordinated collective 
action. Such action entails identifying useful political 
opportunities beyond the constitution-making process, such as 
influential allies; obtaining access to resources that assist in 
facilitating mobilization and legitimizing the organizations' goals; 
and framing the organizations' target goals in ways that are 
congruent with the goals of the political elites and resonate with 
the general public. These strategies assist excluded groups in 
obtaining mternal inclusion during a participatory constitution-
making process. 
Internal inclusion occurs when individuals have an "effective 
opportunity to influence the thinking of others ... when they have 
access to fora and procedures of decision-making."94 Young 
contrasts internal inclusion with internal exclusion, which occurs 
when 
[h]aving obtained a presence in the public, citizens 
sometimes find that those still more powerful in the process 
exercise, often unconsciously, a new form of exclusion: 
others ignore or dismiss or patronize their statements and 
expressions. Though formally included in a forum or 
process, people may find that their claims are not taken 
seriously and may believe that they are not treated with 
equal respect. The dominant mood may find their ideas or 
93 McADAM, supra note 17, at 39. As noted by William Gamson, "[t]he 
competitive establishment is boundary-maintaining." William A. Gamson, Stable 
Unrepresentation in American Society, AM. BEHAVIORAL SciENTIST, Nov.-Dec. 1968, at 
15, 20. 
94 YOUNG, supra note 6, at 55. 
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modes of expression silly or simple, and not worthy of 
consideration. 95 
133 
Internal exclusion can be mitigated by channeling individual 
participation through social movement organizations. Social 
movement organizations are complex or formal organizations that 
work to implement a set of goals that mirror the preferences of a 
social movement or countermovement. 96 A social movement is 
sustained collective action by individuals with "preferences for 
changing some elements of the social structure" who make new or 
unaccepted claims upon the state. 97 Such movements are 
comprised of individuals who lack regular access to state 
institutions and behave in ways that fundamentally challenge 
society and/ or authorities. 98 Social movement organizations use a 
95 Id. William Gamson makes a similar distinction between members and 
challengers within political society. WILLIAM A GAMSON, THE STRATEGY OF SoCIAL 
PROTEST 140 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter SoCIAL PROTEST] ("The central difference 
among political actors is captured by the idea of being inside or outside of the 
polity. Those who are inside are members whose interest is vested- that is, 
recognized as valid by other members. Those who are outside are challengers. 
They lack the basic prerogative of members-routine access to decisions that 
affect them."). 
96 John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, Resource Mobilization and Social 
Movements: A Partial Theory, 82 AM. J. Soc. 1212, 1217 (1977). 
97 Id. at 1218 (noting that a countermovement is "a set of opinions and beliefs 
in a population opposed to a social movement."); see also SIDNEY TARROW, POWER 
IN MOVEMENT: SociAL MOVEMENTS AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 3 (2d ed. 1998) 
(describing collective action "used by people . . . who act in the name of new or 
unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others 
or authorities."). 
98 See TARROW, supra note 97, at 2-4; McCarthy & Zald, supra note 96, at 1217-
18 (describing a social movement as individuals seeking to change some elements 
of social structure and/or reward distribution); see also MCADAM, supra note 17, at 
37 (discussing social movements as "rational attempts by excluded groups to 
mobilize sufficient political leverage to advance collective interests."); William A 
Gamson & David S. Meyer, Framing Political Opportunity, in COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES ON SoCIAL MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING 
STRUCTURES, AND CULTURAL FRAMINGS 275, 283 (Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, 
& Mayer N. Zald eds., 1996) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SoCIAL 
MOVEMENTS] (defining a social movement as "a sustained and self-conscious 
challenge to authorities or cultural codes by a field of actors (organizations and 
advocacy networks), some of whom employ extrainstitutional means of 
influence."); David S. Meyer & Sidney Tarrow, The Social Movement Society: 
Contentious Politics for a New Century, in THE SoCIAL MOVEMENT SoCIETY: 
CONTENTIOUS POLITICS FOR A NEW CENTURY 1, 4 (David S. Meyer & Sidney Tarrow 
eds., 1998) (noting that the social movement repertoire of contention has become 
institutionalized in advanced industrial democracies); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, 
Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 CoLUM. L. 
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variety of institutional and non-institutional strategies to make 
their claims and sustain their interaction with political officials, 
legal decision makers, and the general public. 99 They also provide 
individual citizens with the resources, strategies, and support that 
facilitate internal inclusion in an external participatory 
constitution-making process. 
In many post-conflict states the creation and implementation of 
a participatory constitution-making process is controlled by 
political elites. These individuals have generally obtained their 
elite status through victory in an armed conflict or a negotiated 
peace settlement. As with political elites in other political 
environments, in post-conflict states this ruling class has a 
conservative approach to maintaining the boundaries of the 
political system.too While considerable incentives exist for these 
elites to create and implement some nominal participatory 
constitution-making process, there are significantly fewer 
incentives to seriously review and deliberate on the comments, 
proposals, or recommendations offered by most individuals or 
organizations within the society. tot 
REV. 1436, 1503 (2005) (defining a social movement as individuals engaged in a 
"sustained, interactive campaign that makes sustained, collective claims for relief 
or redistribution in response to social marginalization, dislocation, change, or 
crisis."); McCarthy & Zald, supra note 96, at 1217-18 (defining a social movement 
as "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represent preferences for 
changing some elements of the social structure and/ or reward distribution of a 
society."). 
99 Institutionally based strategies target political and legal decision makers by 
utilizing methods like lobbying and pursuing legal challenges. Non-
institutionally based strategies are generally employed when advocates have 
limited access to political and legal institutions and/ or make claims that are 
incapable of being recognized within political and legal institutions. See TARROW, 
supra note 97, at 3 (arguing that while most collective action occurs within 
institutions, it becomes contentious when used by people who lack regular access 
to institutions). These strategies include activities like demonstrations, marches, 
and community education. See McCarthy & Zald, supra note 96, at 1218-19 
(discussing the use of social movement organizations during the civil rights 
movement to represent and shape the broadly-held preferences of the social 
movement); see also Brown-Nagin, supra note 98, at 1504-05 (enumerating the 
collective activities engaged in by members of social movements). 
1oo See WALTER, supra note 22, at 29-30 (discussing the tendency of post-war 
factions to "insulate themselves from future harm and to prevent their rival from 
consolidating power."); SoCIAL PROTEST, supra note 95, at 20 (characterizing 
political mobilization as a response to crises in the achievement of a group's 
collective goals). 
1o1 Government officials utilizing external participatory systems are 
predominantly focused on gathering support for and increasing the legitimacy of 
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Becoming a core participant in an externally inclusive 
participatory constitution-making process requires inclusion. 
Inclusion entails having an "effective opportunity to influence the 
thinking" of the drafters, which requires being treated as an equal 
and having one's claims taken seriously. Inclusion does not 
necessarily follow from formal access to the drafting body. Social 
movements and social movement organizations are mechanisms 
that can facilitate core participation within externally inclusive 
participatory systems.1o2 
Social movement organizations provide individuals with 
resources, strategies, and support that assist in the quest to become 
core participants. The involvement of such an organization does 
not guarantee substantive success, but it significantly increases the 
likelihood that its members will obtain inclusion. Absent 
organized participation, there is a significant risk that an 
individual's contributions, proposals, or recommendations will not 
be reviewed and deliberated by the constitution drafting body. 
Three main theoretical approaches have emerged in the 
sociological study of social movements. Theorists examining the 
emergence and sustainability of social movements have 
alternatively focused on the availability of political opportunities, 
access to mobilizing resources, and framing strategies. These three 
factors not only influence the ability of social movement 
organizations to emerge, but also the extent to which they are 
sustainable and successful in obtaining their desired outcomes. 
The desired outcomes of interest in this article are constitutional 
solutions to the problems identified by the social movement 
organizations. For example, gender equity advocates in Rwanda 
sought equal protection and non-discrimination clauses in addition 
to provisions guaranteeing gender equity in matters relating to 
marriage and children and guaranteed representation for women 
within the state's legislative bodies. 
Sidney Tarrow, a leading social movement scholar, contends 
that social movements emerge as a result of new political 
a specific governance system. In such systems political elites envisage a particular 
governance system and they consult the public in an effort to gain support for 
their vision. See supra Section 2.1. 
1o2 Other scholars such as Iris Marion Young focus on modes of political 
communication to respond to internal exclusion. See YOUNG, supra note 6, at 56-57 
(noting the importance of communication in establishing trust and motivating 
action). 
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opportunities.103 Political opportunities refer to "consistent-but 
not necessarily formal or permanent-dimensions of the political 
environment that provide incentives for collective action by 
affecting people's expectations for success or failure."104 The 
political opportunity framework identifies increases in political 
access, influential allies, divided elites, and declining state 
repression as the factors providing the incentives. los 
1o3 T ARROW, supra note 97, at 71-85. The applicability of the political 
opportunity structure in non-democratic studies has been questioned. Kurt 
Schock examined the relevance of political opportunities to the emergence and 
success of social movement organizations in the Philippines and Burma. He 
concluded that the theoretical framework has explanatory power in non-
democratic societies. Kurt Schock, People Power and Political Opportunities: Social 
Movement Mobilization and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma, 46 Soc. PRoBS. 
355, 370-71 (1999). 
104 TARROW, supra note 97, at 76-77 ("[M]ost opportunities and constraints are 
situational, and cannot compensate for long for weaknesses in cultural, 
ideological, and organizational resources."). 
105 See id. at 71 (showing the importance of political opportunity factors in the 
emergence of social movements); ScHOCK, supra note 90, at 27-30 (discussing 
requisites for collective action); see also Doug McAdam, Conceptual Origins, Current 
Problems, Future Directions, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECITVES ON SoCIAL MOVEMENTS, 
supra note 98, at 23, 26-29 (outlining the dimensions of political opportunity); 
Schock, supra note 103, at 356-57 (explaining the relevance of the political 
opportunity framework for social movements in the Philippines and Burma). 
The political opportunity framework has been critiqued as being biased 
toward developed democracies, yet recent studies have demonstrated its 
applicability in non-democratic contexts. For example, a study of democratization 
movements in the Philippines and Burma found that elite divisions and 
influential allies affected the movements' success. 
Political access, the institutionalized points of access to political decision 
makers in the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of government, can be 
particularly difficult in non-democratic states. In such states political power is 
generally centralized within the executive branch such that legislatures and 
judiciaries have little independent power. See Schock, supra note 103, at 361 
(explaining limited points of access in non-democratic societies); see also AKE, 
supra note 35, at 3-5 (noting the prevalence of leadership amassing and 
centralizing political power in post-colonization Africa); Samuels, supra note 6, at 
679-80 (explaining the inability of other branches in a fledgling government to 
appropriately check and balance the executive). 
Influential allies provide organizational expertise, financial assistance, and 
leadership, and can lower the power discrepancy between the ruling political 
elites and civil society. See Schock, supra note 103, at 361; see also Sidney Tarrow, 
States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements, in 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SoCIAL MOVEMENlS, supra note 98, at 41, 55-56 
(noting the importance of influential allies in the American farm workers 
movements and movements resisting Eastern European socialist regimes). 
Members of the international community, foreign governments, non-
governmental organizations, and inter-governmental organizations play a 
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Participatory constitution-making advocates focus exclusively 
on the creation of one type of political opportunity: increased 
access to political institutions. An unstated assumption within this 
literature is that broadening the political space within a state will 
provide a sufficient incentive to increase citizen participation and 
for government officials to actively engage citizens. Such citizen 
involvement and government responsiveness requires more. 
Increased political access, in this case a participatory constitution-
making process, is but one type of political opportunity that is 
necessary to increase individual participation through the 
emergence and sustainability of social movement organizations. 
The use of participatory constitution making offered a new 
point of institutional access for Rwandan citizens. The public 
meetings and the acceptance of written comments by the LCC 
provided citizens with an opportunity to engage the constitution 
drafters. The LCC' s engagement with the public represented a 
significant break from Rwanda's authoritarian past. Rwanda had 
been a one-party state for approximately twenty years and the 
significant role as influential allies in non-democratic states. These states often 
lack robust and active political parties, professional associations, labor unions, 
and other similar organizations, and when they do exist they are generally 
controlled by the state, which limits the existence of local influential elites. 
Schock, supra note 103, at 361. 
Division amongst elites can provide an incentive for less empowered civil 
society actors to mobilize. Such divisions can widen "the circle of conflict" to 
include the civil society actors and give them marginal power as a result of some 
elites taking on the role of "tribune of the people" to increase their political 
influence. T ARROW, supra note 97, at 56. In post-conflict states such divisions 
could be more harmful than helpful in successfully designing and implementing 
democratic reforms. The negotiation of a peace agreement amongst the main 
combatants provides a degree of certainty and comfort to these parties. If that 
certainty is undermined by significant elite divisions regarding the state's form of 
political rule, armed conflict could resume. Schock found that elite divisions, 
particularly divisions within the military, influenced whether repression 
successfully deterred civil society activity or whether it provided a basis for civil 
society mobilization. Schock, supra note 103, at 361, 369. 
In non-democratic states repression is often used indiscriminately against the 
entire population, and Schock found that it decreased the legitimacy of the 
governing regime. Yet in Burma the state's repression also suppressed the 
democratization movement. He concludes that the presence or absence of other 
aspects of political opportunities influences the effect that repression will have. 
The existence of elite divisions, particularly in the military, and the free flow of 
alternative information, facilitated civil society mobilization in both countries. 
When the elite division was reduced, influential allies did not exist, and 
alternative flows of information were not available, state repression demobilized 
the democratization efforts. ld. at 368. 
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regime has been characterized as a dictatorship that consistently 
coerced, repressed, and violated the rights of Rwandan citizens.106 
Having LCC commissioners move throughout the country to 
discuss the state's new constitution represented a break from 
traditional Rwandan politics. Yet, the extent to which the use of 
participatory constitution making was perceived as a new political 
opportunity depended upon the problems that one sought to have 
addressed and how one sought to have them addressed.107 For 
example, advocates interested in advancing the interests of specific 
ethnic groups were silenced due to the government's position that 
ethnic-based claims undermined the state's unity and 
reconciliation goals.1os 
External participatory processes increase institutional access, 
but they do so differentially. The usefulness of this opening will 
depend on other political opportunities like influential allies, 
divisions within elites, declining repression, and shifting political 
alignments. Tarrow contends that the instability of political 
alignments encourages contention. "[T]he changing fortunes of 
government and opposition parties create uncertainty among 
supporters, encourage challengers to try to exercise marginal 
power, and may even induce elites to compete for support from 
outside the polity."Io9 
The RPF's desire for broad appeal throughout Rwanda 
provided an opportunity for gender equity advocates to trade their 
political support for gender equity constitutional provisions. 
Taking advantage of such shifts in political alignments often 
106 See PRUNIER, supra note 41, at 61, 80-90, 211-12 (documenting President 
Habyarimana' s reign before the genocide in Rwanda); LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE 
STORY, supra note 47 (outlining Rwanda's oppressive past). 
107 See TARROW, supra note 97, at 77 (noting that political opportunities "may 
not be apparent all at once to all potential challengers."). 
1os The politically repressive environment in Rwanda during the constitution-
making process significantly affected who was able to successfully organize and 
mobilize. See infra text accompanying notes 113-14 for discussion of state 
repression and political opportunities. 
109 TARROW, supra note 97, at 78; see also SCHOCK, supra note 90, at 30 (noting 
that "political opportunities may be even more important for challenges in 
nondemocracies than in democracies, since opportunities for dissent are less 
common and therefore any signs of political opportunity are likely to generate 
opposition."); T ARROW, supra note 97, at 78-79 (pointing out that "[i]n less-than-
democratic regimes, the lack of routinized competition makes any sign of political 
instability a signal and a source for contention."). 
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requires the support of influential allies.11o In non-democratic 
states where social movement organizations have fewer internal 
resources, influential allies are particularly important.111 Allies 
provide resources for social movement organizations such as 
legitimacy, access, and material resources such as office space or 
office equipment.112 
Finally, state repression hinders the emergence and 
sustainability of social movement organizations. Charles Tilly 
defines repression as "any action by another group which raises 
the contender's cost of collective action. An action which lowers 
the group's cost of collective action is a form of facilitation."n3 
Repressive techniques are more likely to be used against social 
movement organizations ("SMOs") that seek fundamental changes 
within a society that threaten the political, social, and economic 
power of the elite. Social movement organizations seeking modest 
changes within the society are less likely to experience such 
repress10n ·even within authoritarian or repressive 
environments.n4 
Another major theoretical perspective within the sociological 
study of social movements focuses on the availability of mobilizing 
resources. The level of action that an SMO can direct toward 
achieving its target goals is argued to be a function of the resources 
that the SMO controls.ns Resources relevant for SMO emergence 
11o William Gamson's research demonstrates a correlation between 
movement success and influential allies. In the fifty-three "conflict groups" he 
examined, success was closely related to the presence or absence of political allies. 
SoCIAL PROTFST, supra note 95, at 64-66. 
1n TARROW, supra note 97, at 80; see also SCHOCK, supra note 90, at 34 (noting 
that "in nondemocracies, the Catholic Church, religious workers, development 
workers, and human rights organizations and the international networks in which 
they are embedded have provided crucial support for the oppressed in their 
challenges to the state."). 
112 See ScHOCK, supra note 90, at 33-34 (providing examples of the importance 
of third party allies in political movements); TARROW, supra note 97, at 79. 
m MOBILIZATION, supra note 91, at 100 (emphasis omitted). 
114 TARROW, supra note 97, at 80. The state's response to individuals and 
organizations seeking political participation in Rwanda exemplifies the 
differential use of state repression depending upon the nature of the claims made 
against the state. Political parties that the state thought were seeking political 
participation by organizing around ethnicity were declared illegal and their 
leaders were charged with criminal offenses. See infra text accompanying notes 
191-94. Gender equity advocates that sought guaranteed political representation 
for women had a much different experience. They achieved internal inclusion 
within the constitution-making process and the government more broadly. 
11s John D. McCarthy, Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting, Adapting, and 
140 U. Pa.]. Int'l. L. [Vol. 29:1 
and success in achieving its target goals are legitimacy, money, 
facilities, and labor.n6 McCarthy and Zald, the leading proponents 
of the resource mobilization perspective on social movements, 
contend that SMOs have two broad categories of people and 
organizations from whom they can obtain support-adherents and 
constituents. II Adherents are those individuals and organizations 
that believe in the goals of the movement" while constituents 
provide resources for the movement.117 These two categories can 
be further divided based upon the amount of resources the 
individuals or organizations control. McCarty and Zald use the 
adjective mass to refer to those individuals and organizations that 
control a limited pool of resources, and elite for those that II control 
larger resource pools."ns Another important distinction to make 
amongst potential resource providers is whether or not they will 
directly benefit from the SMO achieving its target goals. Those 
that will are termed potential beneficiaries, while those that will not 
are described using the adjective conscience, such as conscience 
adherents or conscience constituents.n9 SMOs that focus their 
attention on beneficiary adherents for resources are classic SMOs, 
in contrast to professional SMOs that direct their efforts toward 
conscience adherents.12o In Rwanda, gender equity advocates 
represent a mixed classic-professional SMO. Through the umbrella 
organization Collectif Pro-Femmes/Twese Hamwe ("Pro-
Femmes"), gender equity advocates worked with locally-based 
women's organizations to transform bystanders into adherentst2t 
Inventing, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECfiVF5 ON SociAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 98, at 
141; McCarthy & Zald, supra note 96, at 1221 (noting that "resources must be 
controlled or mobilized before action is possible."). 
116 McCarthy & Zald, supra note 96, at 1220; see also ScHOCK, supra note 90, at 
29 (stating that mobilizing structures are the "networks through which the 
mobilization of tangible resources, people, and organized collective action 
occurs .. ") 
117 McCarthy & Zald, supra note 96, at 1221. 
11s Id. 
119 ld. at 1221-22. William A. Gamson makes a similar distinction, referring 
to social movement organizations with goals that help nonconstituents as 
universalistic and those SMOs whose goals focus on constituents as 
nonuniversalistic. SociAL PROTEST, supra note 95. 
120 McCarthy & Zald, supra note 96, at 1223. 
121 This process of transforming bystanders into adherents generally involved 
persuading individuals that they were potential beneficiaries. Madeline 
Mukarwigema, a member of Duhozanye, a locally-based women's organization in 
Save district, Butare, noted that 
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and to utilize beneficiary adherents and elite conscience adherents 
like the Rwandan Forum of Women Parliamentarians, the Ministry 
of Gender, Family and Social Affairs ("MIGEPROFE"), and the 
United Nations Development Fund for Women ("UNIFEM"). 
Government authorities play a significant role in either 
frustrating or enabling SMO resource mobilization.122 They can 
influence the readiness of bystanders, adherents, and constituents 
to provide resources. Such actors played a significant role in the 
ability of Rwandan political organizations to mobilize around 
ethnic identities. In 2002, the Mouvement Democratique 
Republicain (Democratic Republican Movement) ("MDR"), a 
prominent political party, was disbanded by the Transitional 
National Assembly for engaging in divisionism.123 On the other 
hand, government authorities aided gender equity advocates in 
their mobilization efforts. For example, the LCC worked with 
UNIFEM to organize gender sensitization workshops for local 
government officials throughout Rwanda before the commission 
began its public consultation activities.124 
UNIFEM and other international organizations also assisted 
Rwandan gender equity advocates by providing another 
significant resource-a collection or inventory of successful 
strategic tactics. Social movement scholars refer to this as a social 
movement organizations' repertoire of contention or collective 
action repertoire.125 When engaging in contentious politics, social 
[w]e never took gender into consideration .. . . Before we received 
training in gender, we thought that we had arrived at the summit of 
sexual equality because we were doing jobs and tasks which had 
previously been reserved for men only, like masonry, milking cows 
etc. . . . After the training, we saw that we had an incomplete 
understanding of gender. 
WOMEN FOR WOMEN lNTL BRIEFING PAPER, WOMEN TAKING A LEAD: PROGRESS 
TOWARD EMPOWERMENT AND GENDER EQUITY IN RWANDA 17-18 (2004), available at 
http:/ jwww.wornenforwomen.org/nrrwpap.html [hereinafter WOMEN TAKING A 
LEAD). 
122 SCHOCK, supra note 90, at 30-31; McCarthy & Zald, supra note 96, at 1222. 
123 See infra notes 193-96 for further discussion of this event. 
124 Republic of Rwanda Legal & Const. Cornm'n, Rapport d'activites et financier 
du projet: Contribution des femmes dans !'elaboration de la prochaine Constitution 
Rwandaise dans les Provinces de Kibungo-Umutara-Gitrama-Gikongoro, [Business and 
Financial Report: Women's Contribution to the Development of the Rwandan 
Constitution in the Kibungo-Urnutara-Gitrarna-Gikongoro Provinces] at *1, 
http:/ jwww.cjcr.gov.rw /rapportFernmes.doc (last visited Oct. 22, 2007). 
125 CHARLES TILLY, POPULAR CONTENTION IN GREAT BRITAIN 1758-1834, at 43 
(1995) [hereinafter POPULAR CONTENTION]; Karen Beckwith, Gender Frames and 
142 U. Pa. J. Int'l. L. [Vol. 29:1 
movement organizations utilize a narrow set of learned and shared 
routines based on past successful actions.126 They are aware that 
certain actions are more successful than others in mobilizing 
supporters and enabling SMOs to achieve their target goals.127 
Rwanda's gender equity advocates received significant 
assistance regarding strategic tactics from their domestic and 
international elite adherents, primarily UNIFEM, the Rwandan 
Forum of Women Parliamentarians, and MIGEPROFE. Pro-
Femmes primarily utilized institutional strategies.12s The 
Rwandan Forum of Women Parliamentarians was able to advise 
Pro-Femmes on effective strategies for lobbying members of the 
Transitional National Assembly. MIGEPROFE did so with regard 
to the RPF and other executive officials. UNIFEM offered a more 
global perspective on the general types of activities that Pro-
Femmes should be engaged in to transform government officials 
into conscience constituents or adherents. 
Decisions regarding strategic tactics are not only relevant for 
the SMOs' ability to interact successfully with decision makers, but 
they play a significant role in the SMOs' ability to mobilize 
individuals and organizations to act. The institutional or non-
institutional strategies utilized by a social movement organization 
will influence whether bystanders are transformed into adherents 
and whether adherents will become constituents. A social 
movement organization's selection of tactics that resonate with 
individuals and organizations as strategies that could make a 
Collective Action: Configurations of Masculinity in the Pittston Coal Strike, 29 POL. & 
Soc'y 297, 299 (2001). 
126 POPULAR CoNTENTION, supra note 125, at 43 (defining "repertoires of 
contention" as "the established ways in which pairs of actors make and receive 
claims bearing on each other's interests."). A repertoire of contention is 
comprised of "sets of leamed behaviors that participants call upon and employ in 
specific social movement situations, and are manifested in 'well-defined forms [of 
political participation] already familiar to the participants.'" Beckwith, supra note 
125, at 299 (quoting MOBILIZATION, supra note 91, at 143); see also John D. 
McCarthy, Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting, Adapting, and Inventing, in 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECfiVES ON SoCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 98 (referring to 
"agreed upon ways of engaging in collective action" as a mobilizing resource). 
127 Beckwith, supra note 125, at 299-300; see also CHARLES TILLY, THE 
CONTENTIOUS FRENCH 390 (1986) ("[P)eople tend to act within known limits, to 
innovate at the margins of existing forms, and to miss many opportunities 
available to them in principle."). 
128 See supra note 99 for a discussion of institutional and non-institutional 
strategles for contentious politics. 
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difference will affect the SMO' s recruitment efforts.129 Getting 
individuals and organizations to believe that through collective 
action they can achieve their desired goals is an important function 
of SMOs. As noted earlier, the availability of political 
opportunities influences whether SMOs will emerge, but political 
opportunities are relative, and SMOs often spend a great deal of 
time and energy debating whether an open moment exists and 
whether institutional or non-institutional strategies are most 
appropriate.l30 Consequently, deploying frames that "define 
people as potential agents of their own history" and that suggest 
the possibility of changing an undesirable situation through 
collective action plays a significant role in mobilization.m 
The role of strategic framing in social movement emergence 
and sustainability is the third significant theoretical approach to 
studying social movements. Framing is one way that SMOs 
attempt to align their definition of a problem and proposed 
solutions with the interpretive framework of other members of the 
society in order to gain adherents and constituents.l32 Alignment 
requires enabling individuals to see that some set of their interests, 
values, and beliefs are congruent and complementary with the 
SMO' s activities, goals, and ideology .133 Two components of a 
framing strategy are the diagnostic frame and the prognostic 
frame. Diagnostic framing identifies the problem and attributes 
blame.134 This process focuses the target audience's attention on a 
specific issue and helps determine how the issue will be perceived, 
which helps to focus attention on the desired outcome.Bs 
129 David A. Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and 
Movement Participation, 51 AM. Soc. REV. 464, 470 (1986) (noting that participation 
in SMO activities "is more likely" when there is a positive connection "between 
beliefs about the object of action and the nature of that action."). 
130 Gamson & Meyer, supra note 98, at 283-84. 
m Id. at 285. 
132 See discussion of framing and social movements infra Section 4.2. 
133 Snow et al., supra note 129, at 467 (defining frame alignment as the 
conjunction of individual and SMO interpretive frameworks); Doug McAdam, The 
Framing Function of Movement Tactics: Strategic Dramaturgy in the American Civil 
Rights Movement, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SoCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 
98, at 340; see also Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social 
Movements: An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. Soc. 611, 615 (2000) 
(viewing collective action frames as negotiations of shared understandings). 
134 Benford & Snow, supra note 133, at 615. 
135 Daniel M. Cress & David A. Snow, The Outcomes of Homeless Mobilization: 
The Influence of Organization, Disruption, Political Mediation, and Framing, 105 AM. J. 
Soc. 1063, 1071 (2000). 
144 U. Pa. J. Int'l. L. [Vol. 29:1 
Prognostic framing addresses what is to be done about the 
problem articulated by the diagnostic frame. It is "a proposed 
solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack, and the 
strategies for carrying out the plan."l36 
Successful frame alignment requires that the SMO frames 
resonate with the broader culture and existing values to enable the 
frame to appear natural and familiar.137 SMOs draw on a variety 
of cultural norms and values in constructing their frames. Gender 
equity advocates in Rwanda successfully utilized international 
norms and legal commitments as the substance of their prognostic 
frame but also relied on RPF-articulated norms and values for their 
general framing strategy. Pro-Femmes argued that it was 
necessary to protect gender equity in family and political life in the 
Constitution, not only to address women's marginalization, but to 
t36 Benford & Snow, supra note 133, at 616. 
137 MYRA MARX FERREE ET AL., SHAPING ABORTION DISCOURSE: DEMOCRACY AND 
THE PuBLIC SPHERE IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 70 (2002) [hereinafter 
SHAPING ABORTION DISCOURSE] ("In all public arenas .. . social problems that can 
be related to deep mythic themes or broad cultural preoccupations have a higher 
probability of competing successfully." (quoting Stephen Hilgartner & Charles L. 
Bosk, The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public Arenas Model, 94 AM. J. Soc. 53, 
71 (1988))); Benford & Snow, supra note 133, at 619-22, 624 (identifying types of 
collective action frames and the factors affecting resonance); Rita K. Noonan, 
Women Against the State: Political Opportunities and Collective Action Frames in 
Chile's Transition to Democracy, 10 Soc. FORUM 81, 94 (1995). 
For every resonating theme there is a competing theme that draws on 
language that appears similarly natural and familiar. SHAPING ABORTION 
DISCOURSE, supra at 70 ("Themes and counterthemes are paired with each other so 
that whenever one is invoked, the other is always present in latent form, ready to 
be activated with the proper cue." (quoting WILLIAM A. GAMSON, TALKING POLITICS 
135 (1992))); see also Benford & Snow, supra note 133, at 625-27 (describing framing 
contests among competing viewpoint groups). Themes are carried by 
organizational actors who have different levels of access to decision-making 
processes and decision makers. This is another basis upon which frames are 
advantaged or disadvantaged. The field in which the framing contest takes place 
is not constant; it is "full of hills and valleys, barriers, traps, and impenetrable 
jungles." SHAPING ABORTION DISCOURSE, supra at 62. 
(T]he contours of the playing field can change suddenly in the middle of 
the contest because of events that lay beyond the control of the players; 
and players can themselves sometimes change the contours through 
actions that create new discursive opportunities. This complex playing 
field provides advantages and disadvantages in an uneven way to the 
various contestants in framing contests. 
Id. Part of the complicated field of constitution-making processes in post-conflict 
states is the significant amount of power held by political elites. 
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promote peace, unity, and reconciliation in Rwanda.13S The RPF's 
governance frame named peace, unity, and reconciliation as the 
targeted goals, and identified divisionism as a barrier to these 
goals. Pro-Femmes aligned gender equity with the attainment of 
these goals and created a framing strategy that did not contradict, 
but was actually congruent with the RPF' s governance frame. 
4. ACHIEVING INTERNAL INCLUSION IN RWANDA 
Women have been actively involved in identifying ways to 
promote peace, unity, and reconciliation within Rwanda. Much of 
this activity has taken place through grassroots and national 
women's organizations. These organizations have a long history in 
Rwanda. During Rwanda's early post-colonial years, the 
government supported social centers for women in each 
prefecture. Rural women were encouraged to meet and discuss 
common problems at these centers that were staffed by young 
female social workers.139 After Juvenal Habyarimana became 
president, an increasing number of grassroots organizations, 
cooperatives, NGOs, and church-related groups appeared 
throughout Rwanda. A 1985 survey of 133 NGOs found that the 
support offered to rural women emphasized domestic 
responsibilities but did not address agrarian, commercial, 
intellectual, or political activities.140 In 1987, out of 1,457 civil 
society organizations, 143 were registered as women's NGOs and 
these organizations sought to focus attention on the conditions 
facing women and the need for women's participation in 
development.141 
After years of war and genocide, women in Rwanda faced 
shattered communities in which the men had been killed or had 
fled. Women had to find ways to survive in these new 
environments. They had to cope with the physical and 
psychological harm they suffered; find food, shelter, and clothing; 
and care for their children, orphans, and other relatives. The state 
138 See infra text accompanying notes 182-98 for further discussion of Pro-
Femmes' framing strategy. 
139 Catharine Newbury & Hannah Baldwin, Confronting the Aftermath of 
Conflict: Women's Organizations in Postgenocide Rwanda, in WOMEN AND CIVIL WAR: 
IMPACT, ORGANIZATIONS, AND AcriON 97, 98 n.1 (Krishna Kumar ed., 2001). 
140 !d. at 99 n.4 (citing INAOES FORMATION RWANDA, INVENT AIR O.N.G. 1985, 
at 17-18 (1985)). 
141 Id. at 99. 
146 U. Pa. ]. Int'l. L. [Vol. 29:1 
lacked the resources to address the material needs of the citizenry 
so women began organizing to address their common problems by 
building on previous rural organizations that provided economic 
and social support.t42 In Kigali, women who had been active in 
national women's organizations before 1994 began meeting, 
offering each other support, and voicing their concerns about the 
challenges facing women and children.143 Joined by women 
returning to Rwanda from exile,l44 these women began to rebuild 
the member organizations of the umbrella group, Pro-Femmes, 
which existed before the war. As the women met and discussed 
their challenges, they sought new ways to meet their needs. Out of 
these discussions the women drafted the Campaign for Peace as a 
blueprint for addressing Rwanda's social and economic problems 
with a particular focus on the critical needs of women and 
children. The Campaign for Peace proposed new ways to involve 
women in promoting reconstruction and reducing social tensions. 
Organizations like Pro-Femmes received a lot of international 
support, which provided an important source of funding. These 
resources enabled national women's organizations to undertake 
large-scale ambitious projects. Women's organizations also 
obtained the support of the Government of National Unity 
("GNU"), Rwanda's interim government. A Ministry of Gender, 
Family and Social Affairsl45 was included in the GNU from the 
142 Id. at 98. 
143 ld. 
144 Within Rwanda, distinctions are made between recent returnees and "old 
caseload refugees." Recent returnees are the Rwandans that fled the country after 
the genocide, contrasted with the "old caseload refugees," who left Rwanda in 
1959 and the early 1960s in response to widespread violence against Tutsi 
Rwandans, and who returned to Rwanda after the RPF victory. WoMEN's 
COMM'N FOR REFUGEE WOMEN & CHILDREN DELEGATION, RWANDA'S WOMEN AND 
CHILDREN: THE LONG ROAD TO RECONCILIATION *5 (1997) (assessing the protection 
and assistance needs of Rwandan women and children) [hereinafter THE LONG 
ROAD]. The Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children reports that 
[f]ew of the projects supported by the Rwandan Women's Initiative or 
other international organizations are benefiting refugee returnee groups 
or Hutu-run associations. In fact, it was difficult for the Women's 
Commission to interview recent returnees, as most of the programs are 
set up to assist genocide survivors or are run by "old caseload" refugees, 
people of Tutsi background who returned in the last three years from 
Burundi, Kenya, Uganda and other countries. 
ld. at *16. 
145 This ministry was divided into the Ministry of Social Affairs and the 
Ministry of Gender and Promotion of Women's Development in 1999. I will use 
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beginning, and its first minister, Aloisea Inyumba, was a founding 
member of the RPF .146 She was born and raised in Uganda and 
arrived in Rwanda in 1990. She was the youngest member of the 
GNU and the only woman. Through the Ministry of Gender, 
Family and Social Affairs, Inyumba organized national women's 
networks to address women's problems similar to the projects 
undertaken by Pro-Femmes.147 
All of these activities caused a dramatic increase in the number 
of women's organizations throughout the country. A 1997 study 
estimated that there was an average of 100 women's associations in 
each of the country's 154 communes.148 These organizations target 
different populations. For example, organizations focus on 
widows, orphans, girls, rural women, or women caring for 
orphans. They are also involved in a range of activities, which 
include shelter projects that assist female heads of households 
repair damaged homes and build new ones; microcredit lending 
programs; promoting women's legal rights, for example lobbying 
to revise inheritance laws to remove gender discriminatory 
provisions and assisting women and children in claiming their 
rights in court; promoting education for girls; vocational training 
and civic education for women; and medical assistance, both 
physical and psychological.149 These activities made the 
organizations relevant in the lives of women across the country. 
the acronym MIGEPROFE (Ministere du Genre et de Ia Promotion de Ia Femme) 
to refer to the ministry both before and after the split. 
146 The Arusha Peace Agreement had included a similar ministry, the 
Ministry of Family Affairs and Promotion of the Status of Women, and it was 
given to the MRND. Rwanda Power-Sharing Agreement, supra note 22, art. 56. 
147 Her program, the Rwanda Women's Initiative, is a national network of 
women's organizations at the grassroots level. The initiative brings together 
Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa women to talk about their common needs and was funded 
by the United States State Department and the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees. Inyumba has stated that, "[t]he firs~ meetings were very difficult ... I 
organized week-long workshops for reconciliation. At the first sessions the 
[Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa] women sat in separate comers, but they had to share 
sleeping mats, soap, food. Finally, they had to acknowledge that they needed 
each other." By the end of the workshop Inyumba noted that the women "opened 
up to the possibility of working together to solve their common problems." Jane 
Ciabattari, From Rwanda's Ashes, Women Are Building Anew, WOMEN's ENEWS, Oct. 
2, 2000, http:/ fwww.womensenews.org/article.cfm?aid=290 (last visited Oct. 22, 
2007). 
148 Newbury & Baldwin, supra note 139, at 100. A commune is a former 
territorial administrative unit. Rwanda was divided into twelve prefectures, 
which in turn were divided into 154 communes. 
149 Id. at 100-11. 
148 U. Pa. J. Int'l. L. [Vol. 29:1 
The network of women's organizations throughout Rwanda 
provided a foundation for mobilizing and developing a 
constituency that would support a multi-faceted campaign to have 
Rwanda's new constitution address gender equity. 
4.1. Obtaining Influential Allies 
Within Rwanda's political environment, a key facet of the 
campaign was obtaining influential allies. The structure of the 
public consultations gave gender equity advocates access to the 
drafting body through public meetings and written submissions. 
The cultivation of influential allies significantly increased that 
access qualitatively and quantitatively. Women's organizations 
developed strategic relationships with international organizations 
like the UNIFEM, the Rwandan Forum of Women 
Parliamentarians, and MIGEPROFE, the Rwandan ministry 
responsible for gender issues.1so These various relationships 
enabled gender equity advocates to assist in setting the agenda for 
several LCC public meetings and to contribute to the LCC 
substantive deliberations. 
UNIFEM partnered with the LCC to organize sensitization 
workshops throughout the country. These workshops took place 
before the general LCC public consultation process began. One 
UNIFEM-sponsored workshop in 2001 was for the LCC members 
and other provincial government officials to provide information 
about the general principles of the Convention on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women ("CEDAW") and the role of 
UNIFEM in Rwanda.tst The other workshops took place in four 
different provinces and were attended by at least one LCC 
member. Rwanda's CEDAW obligations were also discussed in 
these workshops. Questions raised during these workshops 
covered topics such as marriage, polygamy, divorce, alleviating 
1so The Forum of Women Parliamentarians is a caucus for women members 
of parliament that was created with intemational funding and support. It seeks to 
enable women parliamentarians to work together on issues across party lines. 
Through the Forum, women parliamentarians review existing laws and propose 
amendments to discriminatory laws, examine proposed legislation "with an eye 
to gender sensitivity," liaise with women's organizations, and organize meetings 
and training sessions to raise awareness about gender issues. INT'L lNST. 
DEMOCRACY & ELECfORAL ASSISTANCE, WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT: BEYOND NUMBERS 
160 Uulie Ballington & Azza Karam eds., 2005), available at 
http:/ /www.idea.int/publicationsfwip2/ [hereinafter WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT]. 
1s1 Republic of Rwanda Legal & Const. Comm'n, supra note 124, at 1. 
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women's poverty, women's representation in parliament, 
education for girls, and the regulation of political parties.1s2 By 
holding these workshops before the LCC public consultation 
program began, UNIFEM assisted gender equity advocates in 
placing gender on the LCC agenda and having government 
officials and citizens throughout the country begin thinking about 
gender equity and the constitution.I53 
These efforts were complemented by the earlier work by 
MIGEPROFE. This ministry had been involved in sponsoring 
gender mainstreaming workshops for government officials since 
1999.154 MIGEPROFE also held workshops with religious 
communities to discuss gender considerations in development.lss 
These workshops along with those sponsored by UNIFEM 
supported the grassroots consultation work undertaken by Pro-
Femmes. As a result of Pro-Femmes' consultation work, women 
throughout the country were able to gain information about the 
relationship between their concerns and gender equality, the role 
of the constitution in promoting and protecting gender equality, 
and various ways that gender equality can be promoted.IS6 
Participants in the workshops were also able to identify the issues 
they felt were important to women, express their opinions and 
ideas about those and other non-gender issues, and to propose and 
discuss recommendations for addressing the problems 
identified.IS7 Finally, these workshops provided a forum for 
organization leaders and government officials to encourage 
women to participate in consultative forums on the constitution, 
like the November 2002 national conference on the draft 
constitution.1ss Part of encouraging women to participate in the 
national forum included providing training on how to be effective 
152 Id. at 2-4. 
153 See infra text accompanying notes 211-12 for a discussion as to how these 
sessions influenced the comments and suggestions made during the January to 
June 2002 consultation. 
154 ELIZABETH POWLEY, STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE: THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN 
RWANDA's TRANSITION 19 (2003), available at http:/ /www.huntaltematives.org/ 
download/10_strengthening_govemance_the_role_of_women_in_rwanda_s 
_transition. pdf. 
155 Id. 
156 ld.; WOMEN TAKING A LEAD, supra note 121, at 17-18. 
157 POWLEY, supra note 154, at 19; WOMEN TAKING A LEAD, supra note 121, at 
17-18. 
158 POWLEY, supra note 154, at 26. 
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in the mixed gender forum. Traditional norms did not support 
women speaking about their needs in public when men were 
present_159 Women were instructed to: "[s]peak in a clear voice 
and don't forget to introduce yourself before your comment;" 
"[l]et's not make men think, as they've always thought, that 
women talk too much: be brief;" and "[t]ry not to complain about 
what we do not have but ask for what you need by making it a 
suggestion." 160 
This type of assistance in addition to female parliamentarians 
serving as legal advisors informing the women about what to 
expect and encouraging participation has been credited with 
enabling women "to submit their ideas on equal footing with 
men," which "made it difficult for those who were resistant to 
women's contributions to dismiss them."161 
Pro-Femmes' relationship with the Forum of Women 
Parliamentarians and MIGEPROFE was critical in ensuring that 
proposals regarding women's political representation were 
159 Newbury & Baldwin, supra note 139, at 112; WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT, supra 
note 150, at 157. 
160 PoWLEY, supra note 154, at 26. 
161 ld. While some readers may find the advice given to women participating 
in the national conference troubling because it suggests that women must speak 
and behave "like men" in order to participate, it must be understood within the 
context of a campaign that sought integration and inclusion rather than political 
transformation. The women's organizations in Rwanda were not seeking to 
radically reconstruct or transform politics and governance in Rwanda. Their 
strategy was based on a basic acceptance of the governance system and political 
structure created by the RPF. They prioritized inclusion within the RPF-led 
government and as such focused on framing their needs, concerns, ideas, and 
proposals in ways that fit within the status quo. This approach extended to forms 
of communication and ways of making claims. The ability of gender equity 
advocates to effectively convey the diverse range of their needs and concerns may 
have been hampered by their strategic choices. See YOUNG, supra note 6, at 37 
(discussing individuals' ability to convey their needs, concerns, and ideas if they 
are limited to particular forms of communication). 
It does not appear that there were significant debates or discussions amongst 
the various actors within the Rwandan women's organizations about the 
appropriate approach for addressing gender issues. It is possible that there were 
advocates for both the moderate inclusion approach and a more radical 
transformation approach. Both approaches have short-term and long-term costs 
that play a role in the collective action frames utilized by SMOs and their 
evaluation of the availability of political opportunities. See McADAM, supra note 
17, at 37-39 (evaluating distinctions between inclusive and radical approaches to 
social change); So-IOCK, supra note 90, at 27-28 (discussing factors relevant for 
determining the availability of political opportunities); text accompanying notes 
132-34. 
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carefully reviewed and seriously considered by the LCC. The three 
entities submitted a joint policy paper to the LCC with specific 
proposals. The joint approach gave the proposals more political 
weight than recommendations in individual submissions.162 When 
the draft constitution was presented to the TNA, the members of 
the Forum of Women Parliamentarians actively reviewed it to 
ensure that matters relating to gender equity and women's political 
participation were acceptable.163 The relationship between the 
women's organizations and Judith Kanakuze, one of the LCC civil 
society representatives, was also important. Kanakuze became the 
LCC gender expert and supported the proposals put forward by 
women's organizations, the Forum of Women Parliamentarians, 
and MIGEPROFE. Despite not having an official representative 
within the LCC, women's organizations were able to create one 
with Kanakuze. Her presence and support ensured that proposals 
regarding women's political participation would be raised during 
the LCC' s deliberations.164 
Pro-Femmes not only relied on these relationships to have 
topics discussed during the LCC deliberations, but also to monitor 
the entire process. Berthe Mukamusoni, a parliamentarian, 
recalled that "[w]hen writing the constitution, gender started off as 
a separate chapter. We refused and said that it had to be 
integrated."165 The gender equity advocates had to monitor the 
process to ensure that their proposals were included in various 
drafts of the constitution and to see whether potentially 
problematic text had been inserted. The gender equity advocates' 
influential allies played an important role in providing the 
advocates with the information necessary for effective monitoring. 
Monitoring enables SMOs to conduct an ongoing assessment of 
the constitution-making process. Such an assessment involves 
gathering general information about the progression of the process, 
how the rules governing the process are being adhered to, whether 
there have been changes to those rules, and what influence 
162 This is particularly so since the LCC weighted the submissions it received 
and a detailed memorandum by a group received the most points. ANKUT, supra 
note 7, at 18. 
163 See, e.g., Commission Juridique et Constitutionnelle du Rwanda [Legal & 
Const. Comm'n], Actualite, 2003, http:/ jwww.cjcr.gov.rwjactualite.htm (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2007) (noting the review of the constitution by various 
parliamentary committees). 
164 POWLEY, supra note 154, at 26. 
165 Women Taking a Lead, supra note 121, at 16. 
152 U. Pa. J. Int'l. L. [Vol. 29:1 
participants have had during the public consultation stage. 
Disseminating the gathered information facilitates the mobilizing 
function of SMOs. Adherence to the process as planned or 
departures from it provide incentives for the public to participate 
in subsequent activities, such as an approval referendum.l66 
Influential allies assisted gender equity advocates in getting 
their proposals and recommendations reviewed and considered by 
the LCC, but the substance of those proposals and 
recommendations was critical. What gender equity advocates 
sought and how they framed their requests played a significant 
role in their ability to obtain influential allies. In a post-conflict 
context in which democratic political institutions and civil society 
are embryonic, there will be significant hesitation to internally 
include individuals or organizations that seek to challenge or 
undermine the governance system advanced by the political 
elites.I67 The differential access and success of organizations 
166 See text accompanying notes 205-09 for a discussion of the monitoring 
role that civil society organizations played in Kenya. 
Approval referenda provide the last opportunity for the public to participate 
in the constitution-making process. Mobilizing citizens to vote in the referendum 
can provide a check on the drafting body's power by protecting the ideas, 
concerns, and opinions of the public. When the draft inadequately addresses 
concerns raised during the public consultation process, the referendum allows the 
public to reject the draft and prevent the government from claiming the benefits of 
a participatory process and enacting an unacceptable constitution. 
Civil society organizations effectively performed this function in Zimbabwe. 
President Mugabe established a Constitutional Commission in response to 
demands from civil society organizations to revise the constitution. CrR. FOR 
DEMOCRACY & DEV., THE ZIMBABWE CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM: THE REPORT OF 
THE CENTRE FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT OBSERVER MISSION 35 (2000), 
(hereinafter ZIMBABWE CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM). When the draft was put 
before the public it was rejected. Id. at 54. The public was overwhelmingly 
concerned that the draft ignored the concerns raised during the public 
consultation process and that President Mugabe tried to use a democratic 
constitutional review process to gain legitimacy for a marginally democratic 
constitution. DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 5, at 9; ZIMBABWE 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM, supra, at 43-44, 54. While the public's efforts were 
not successful in enacting the desired constitution, they were successful in 
preventing political elites from using a participatory constitution review process 
to ratify their uncompromised political arrangements. Civil society organizations 
were able to influence not only the thinking of the general public and certain 
political actors, but also the final decision. The effectiveness of the public's 
participation was facilitated by a public sphere that did not overwhelrillngly 
hamper the existence and work of civil society organizations. 
167 See, e.g., Angela M. Banks, Moderating Politics in Post-Conflict States: An 
Examination of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 10 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 41-58 
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seeking gender equity versus those seeking robust multi-party 
democracy suggest that successful proposals and 
recommendations must be framed in ways that are consistent with 
the political elite's governance frame and do not undermine the 
existing distribution of political power. 
4.2. Framing Constitutional Conversations 
Individuals exist within a particular cultural context that is 
comprised of "diverse, often conflicting symbols, rituals, stories, 
and guides to action."168 Culture is thus like a tool kit or repertoire 
that individuals select from when making decisions.l69 Frames 
help individuals organize the diverse symbols, images, and ideas 
available within their repertoire into a coherent set of idea 
elements.170 This is done by linking the diverse information to an 
underlying organizing idea that signals what is at stake on a given 
issue. Frames affect what participants identify as problematic, who 
they blame for such problems, and how they believe the problems 
should be resolved. Frames also influence how individuals 
evaluate claims made by other people, including who is qualified 
to speak on particular issues and what type of knowledge or 
information is valuable.l71 Through strategic framing, SMOs 
(2005) (examining resistance by Bosnian nationalist government officials to 
political participation by moderate politicians). 
168 Ann Swidler, Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies, 51 AM. 
SoCIOLOGICAL REV. 273, 277 (1986). 
169 See id. (characterizing culture as a "tool kit" for constructing "strategies of 
action."); Michael Moody & Laurent Thevenot, Comparing Models of Strategy, 
Interests, and the Public Good in French and American Environmental Disputes, in 
RETHINKING COMPARATIVE CULTURAL SoCIOLOGY: REPERTOIRES OF EVALUATION IN 
FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES 229, 275 (Michele Lamont & Laurent Thevenot 
eds., 2000) (hereinafter RETHINKING COMPARATIVE CULTURAL SoCIOLOGY] 
(examining the strategic use of different "cultural repertoires."); Laurent 
Thevenot, Michael Moody & Claudette Lafaye, Forms of Valuing Nature: Arguments 
and Modes of Justification in French and American Environmental Disputes, in 
RETHINKING COMPARATIVE CULTURAL SoCIOLOGY, supra, at 238 (setting out the 
notion of "repertoires" of cultural resources used in the "justification, preparation, 
or explanation of action."). 
170 SHAPING ABORTION DISCOURSE, supra note 137, at 105 (frames are the 
"central organizing ideas that provide coherence to a designated set of idea 
elements."); Benford & Snow, supra note 133, at 614 (citing Goffrnan's definition of 
frames as schemes of interpretation that "enable individuals 'to locate, perceive, 
identify, and label' occurrences within their life space and the world at large."); 
Noonan, supra note 137, at 85. 
171 Framing thus privileges "certain meaning elements at the cost of others" 
and creates a "built-in preference structure." SHAPING ABORTION DISCOURSE, supra 
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attempt to align their definition of a problem and proposed 
solutions with the interpretive framework of other members of the 
society. This requires enabling individuals to see that some set of 
their interests, values, and beliefs are congruent and 
complementary with the organization's activities, goals, and 
ideology .172 
Framing and framing contests take place within a society's 
discursive opportunity structure. This is a society's framework of 
ideas and "meaning-making" institutions, which can be divided 
into three broad categories: political, socio-cultural, and mass 
media.173 It is part of the broader political opportunity structure of 
a society.174 The political components include the government and 
the role of the state and political parties within the society.175 The 
note 137, at xii-xiii; see also Benford & Snow, supra note 133, at 614 (arguing that 
frames help to render events meaningful and function to organize experience and 
guide action); Snow et al., supra note 129, at 464 ("By rendering events or 
occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action, 
whether individual or collective."). There is usually a predominant direction that 
a frame favors and it is generally used to support that direction. SHAPING 
ABORTION DISCOURSE, supra note 137, at 106. The same frame can be used to 
support different policy positions although it is "easier for an actor to be in line 
with the built-in preference structure of the frame chosen." Id. at xiii. For 
example, Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, and Rucht's work on abortion discourse in 
the United States and Germany demonstrates that while the "Fetal Life" frame can 
be used to support pro-life, pro-choice, and neutral positions, its predominant 
direction is that of pro-life. I d. at 106. Frames should not be conflated with policy 
positions because despite the predominant direction of a frame, it can support 
alternative policy positions. For example, the "Fetal Life" frame can be used to 
support a variety of policy positions. Pro-life advocates would contend that "Life 
begins at conception," while pro-choice supporters would state that "Life begins 
at birth," and individuals neutral on the matter would state that "the real issue is 
when life begins." ld. 
172 Benford & Snow, supra note 133, at 615; McAdam, supra note 133, at 340; 
Snow, et al., supra note 129, at 467. 
173 SHAPING ABORTION DISCOURSE, supra note 137, at 62; see also Michele 
Lamont & Laurent Thevenot, Introduction: Toward a Renewed Comparative Cultural 
Sociology, in RETHINKING COMPARATIVE CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY, supra note 169, at 8; 
Swidler, supra note 168, at 277 (examining culture tool-kits and repertoires in 
action); Laurent Thevenot, Michael Moody & Claudette Lafaye, supra note 169, at 
238 (discussing framing in the context of social movements). 
174 See supra note 108 for further discussion of political opportunities. 
175 SHAPING ABORTION DISCOURSE, supra note 137, at 64. Ferree et al., 
developed this typology studying the United States and Germany. Consequently, 
their conception of the discourse opportunity structure is rooted in the 
experiences of developed western democracies. The specific details of each 
component will vary in post-conflict states, particularly the political and mass 
media components. For example, political parties may be non-existent and there 
may be few mass media resources at the disposal of individuals and civil society 
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socio-cultural components include the worldviews, values, norms, 
ways of thinking, practices, and resources within a society and the 
rules that support these elements.176 The socio-cultural 
components "provide a pool of potential legitimating devices for 
particular ways of framing an issue and justifying one's position on 
it."177 Finally, the mass media includes journalistic outlets like 
newspapers, television, and radio. 
Some frames are advantaged because the ideas and language of 
the frame "resonate with the broader culture[,]" which makes the 
frame appear natural and familiar.178 Credibility and salience are 
two interacting factors that affect frame resonance. Credibility is a 
function of three factors: frame consistency, empirical credibility, 
and the credibility of those advancing the frame.179 Frame 
consistency refers to the congruency between an organization's 
beliefs, claims, and actions. Contradictions or inconsistencies can 
exist between an organization's beliefs or claims, or they can exist 
between an organization's framing and its tactical actions. ISO 
Greater and more apparent contradictions decrease frame 
resonance and negatively affect frame acceptance. Empirical 
credibility relates to the fit between the proffered frame and the 
target audience's understanding of events in the world. The more 
culturally believable the evidence is and the more of it there is, the 
more credible the frame and the broader its appeal. Finally, the 
more credibly a speaker is regarded, the more persuasive he or she 
will be. The greater the target audience perceives the status and 
experience of a frame articulator and the organization he or she 
represents to be, the more resonant and plausible the frame and 
claims will be.1s1 
Salience is the other factor that affects resonance, and it has 
three dimensions: centrality, experiential commensurability, and 
organizations. The basic framework, however, is useful in sketching the 
framework of ideas and meaning-making institutions within a society. 
176 Id. at 70. 
177 Id. They also offer varying opportunities to competing framers as they try 
to link their framing of an issue to broader "cultural symbols, themes, and 
narratives." Id. 
178 Jd. 
179 Benford & Snow, supra note 133, at 619; David A. Snow & Robert D. 
Benford, Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization, 1 INT'L Soc. 
MOVEMENT RES. 197 (1988). 
180 Benford & Snow, supra note 133, at 620; Snow & Benford, supra note 179. 
181 Benford & Snow, supra note 133, at 620-21. 
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narrative fidelity. Centrality is a measure of how essential the 
beliefs, values, and ideas of the organization's frame are to the lives 
of the target audience. Whether or not the frames are congruent or 
resonant with the everyday personal experiences of these actors 
reflects the second dimension. If the frames are too abstract or 
distant, they will have little salience. Finally, a link between 
particular frames and cultural narratives, myths, or inherent 
ideology supports cultural resonance. 
In their efforts to ensure that the particular needs of women 
and children were addressed during the reconstruction of Rwanda, 
gender equity advocates sought to increase women's political 
participation. Accepting the GNU's desire to foster peace, unity, 
and reconciliation, gender equity advocates proclaimed that 
achieving this common good could not be attained without the 
active participation of women in politics. The gender-focused 
frame stated that because of women's skills, their unifying 
activities after the genocide, the significant number of women 
heading households, and the majority female population after the 
genocide, they were necessary for the social, political, and 
economic reconstruction of Rwanda.1s2 Gender equity advocates 
were able to frame their concerns regarding the hardships facing 
women and children and gender equity as consistent with 
concerns underlying the quest for unity and reconciliation. 
The ability of civil society organizations to obtain their desired 
outcomes is partially contingent upon developing coherent and 
well-articulated accounts that define the problem, assign blame, 
and determine what should be done to remedy the identified 
problem.183 Two core framing functions, diagnosis and prognosis, 
assist in developing the necessary accounts.184 
l82 WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT, supra note 150, at 157-60; see also ANKUT, supra 
note 7, at 14 (describing the arguments of women's organizations); POWLEY, supra 
note 154, at 15-17 (discussing social belief in the importance of women in 
Rwanda's peace building and reconciliation efforts); Newbury & Baldwin, supra 
note 139, at 98, 104-05 (describing growth of women's political organizations in 
Rwanda). 
183 Cress and Snow found that the successful attainment of desired outcomes 
by homeless social movement organizations required viable organizations with 
articulate diagnostic and prognostic framing. These two factors were necessary, 
but not sufficient for the successful attainment of outcomes. Other factors were 
present and necessary under different conditions. Cress & Snow, supra note 135, 
at 1096. 
184 See supra text accompanying notes 134-36 for additional information on 
diagnostic and prognostic frames. 
2007} CHALLENGING BOUNDARIES 157 
Gender equity advocates developed a frame that identified the 
unique predicaments of women and children in post-conflict 
Rwanda as not only public problems in need of political solutions, 
but as threats to the state's unity and reconciliation.1ss This frame 
also advanced women's political participation as a means for 
addressing the identified problems. Gender equity advocates were 
able to align their gendered frame with the GNU's unity and 
reconciliation frame by bridging the two.186 
Connecting gender equity issues and women's political 
participation to unity and reconciliation in Rwanda was an 
important move in a political climate where differentiated political 
representation was disfavored. Multi-party democracy was 
significantly limited out of fear that party mobilization might 
promote ethnic divisionism. Despite the fact that claims for 
women's guaranteed political participation and multi-party 
democracy both sought to broaden the public's choices for political 
representation, the socio-cultural components of the discursive 
opportunity structure in Rwanda challenged proponents of multi-
party democracy in ways that did not challenge women's 
organizations, but actually supported them. Gender was not 
perceived as a social difference that could divide the society in the 
same way and to the same extent that ethnicity had in the past. 
Rwanda's past experiences with mass violence were episodes in 
which ethnic-based hatred was fostered and exploited. Gender 
differences had never led to similar incidents of mass expulsions 
and violence. Incidentally, in post-genocide Rwanda gender 
differences were often perceived as beneficial for women. Many 
members of society viewed women as symbols of moderation as a 
result of being less involved in the 1994 genocidal violence, less 
corrupt and more attentive and accessible to their communities, 
and willing and able to play key roles in the state's 
reconstruction.187 
185 These problems included the financial and social challenges for female-
headed households; lack of suitable shelter, care for orphans, and medical needs; 
and limited access to food production resources. 
186 Frame bridging links "two or more ideologically congruent but 
structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem." Snow 
et a!., supra note 129, at 467; see, e.g., Tracey Skillington, Politics and the Struggle to 
Define: A Discourse Analysis of the Framing Strategies of Competing Actors in a 'New' 
Participatory Forum, 48 BRIT. J. SOC. 493, 498 (1997) (exemplifying frame-bridging in 
the environmental policy context). 
187 POWLEY, supra note 154, at 15-17; WOMEN TAKING A LEAD, supra note 121, 
at 12-13; see also Noonan, supra note 137, at 91-98 (1995) (examining how women 
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Domestic support for multi-party democracy was not as strong 
or as organized as that for women's political participation. Claims 
advocating multi-party democracy could not be ignored because 
the international community, which had been the initial impetus 
for change in 1991, endorsed such claims.188 Support from political 
actors and within the society at large was mixed because political 
parties, ethnic divisions, and mass violence were strongly 
connected for many people.189 Historically political parties in 
Rwanda were ethnic parties and the parties that developed in the 
1990s followed that pattern. The parties that participated in the 
GNU had specific ethnic identities even though such matters were 
not discussed openly.190 In 1995, Kagame feared that multi-party 
local elections would undermine the development of national 
unity.191 The MDR, the party with the most to gain through multi-
in Chile used dominant cultural and political themes regarding gender roles to 
create a frame that legitimated their protests). 
188 See PRUNIER, supra note 41, at 89-90 (discussing France's push for multi-
party democracy in Rwanda). International or world polity norms can be 
particularly influential in shaping the decisions a state makes regarding its 
governance structure, the rights it protects, and the manner in which it protects 
those rights. See, e.g., Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm 
Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887 (1998) (reviewing norms and 
ideational phenomena in the international context); Ryan Goodman & Derek 
Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 
DUKE L.J. 621 (2004) (discussing ways in which states influence the behavior of 
other states); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of 
Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749 (2003) (examining the ways in which global 
social constraints empower and constrain institutional and state actors); John W. 
Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas & Francisco 0. Ramirez, World Society and 
the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. Soc. 144 (1997) (analyzing nation-states as institutions 
shaped by worldwide cultural and associational processes). 
189 See, e.g., Rwanda: Finally an Election, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, June 13, 2003, at 1, 
4-5 (noting the importance of ethnic divisions in recent elections); Fundamental 
Ideas Report, supra note 63 (suggesting that constitutional limits be placed on the 
number of political parties in Rwanda). 
190 See, e.g., PRUNIER, supra note 41, at 121-26 (examining the existence of 
multi-party politics); Newbury & Baldwin, supra note 139, at 113-14 (discussing 
women's political organizations in post-genocide Rwanda). 
191 President Kagame asked: 
Multi-partyism in African societies, what does it mean? I use any tactic 
to distinguish myself from my neighbour in order to get more votes than 
him. In this game, it does not really matter if I lie. In the current process, 
if you authorise elections, at this present time, you will never build that 
country. You will never have a united country. We won' t have 
democracy: people are going to rush on one another. 
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party democracy as arguably the strongest opposition party, also 
had a lot to maintain under the existing regime. The party was a 
significant participant within the GNU and it did not engage in the 
same sort of organization, strategic framing, and mobilizing as the 
gender equity advocates. The MDR supported the vague rules 
governing divisionism and political parties and as a party did not 
aggressively contest the Transitional National Assembly's decision 
to disband the MDR. For example, when Prime Minister Bernard 
Makuza, an MDR member, was asked about the banning of MDR, 
he stated: 
It is regrettable that MDR had ample time to modify its 
message and public perception of it. There was so much 
effort on my part to reform the party but I failed. 
Parliament made an inquiry and referred the matter to 
cabinet, which in turn referred it to the courts. That is the 
rule of law. There is consensus in government and 
parliament to ban the party. And we must all accept the 
rule of law and the principles of democracy.192 
A parliamentary commission was created to examine claims of 
divisionism by the MDR in 2002. Before the commission began its 
work, a leading figure within the MDR who was close to the RPF 
believed the party would be abolished.193 The party was suffering 
from internal divisions, which likely contributed to the lack of 
MDR-generated mobilization to prevent its dissolution and to 
support multi-party democracy.t94 
In the absence of strong organized domestic mobilization 
around the importance of multi-party democracy and the 
importance of political opposition, the predominant fears 
associated with multi-party democracy prevailed. In accordance 
INT'L CRISIS GROUP, "CONSENSUAL DEMOCRACY" IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA: 
EVALUATING THE MARCH 2001 DISTRICT ELECTIONS, AFRICA REPORT No. 34, at 4 
(2001), available at http:/ jwww.crisisgroup .org/home/index.cfm?id=1647&1=1. 
192 Rwanda: A Country Profile-Prime Minister Talks About Progress over the 
Years, DAILY MONITOR (2003), http:/ /www.monitor.eo.ug/specialincludes/ 
mplsups/rwandasup/rwsup5.php (last visited Feb. 8, 2006) (Ugandan newspaper 
online). 
193 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PREPARING FOR ELECTIONS: TIGHTENING CONTROL IN 
THE NAME OF UNITY 4-5 (2003), available at http:/ /hrw.org/backgrounder/ 
africa/ rwanda0503bck. pdf. 
194 ld. at 5. Some members of the MDR joined the RPF, which gave them a 
political future without having to fight for the existence of the MDR. 
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with international norms regarding democratic governance, the 
Constitution states that "[a] multi-party system of government is 
recognized."t95 The 2003 Constitution, however, limited political 
parties to maintaining offices at the national and provincial 
levels,t96 and subjected political parties to a law on political 
organizations, which together with the Constitution, enabled the 
Senate to refer a political party to the High Court of the Republic 
for promoting divisionism.t97 Divisionism is not defined in the 
Constitution or in the law governing political parties.198 All of 
these factors reduce the likelihood that robust opposition parties 
will develop in Rwanda. 
While supporters of multi-party democracy did not organize in 
the same way that gender equity advocates did, gender equity 
advocates needed more than effective framing strategies. They 
had to convince fellow citizens of the appropriateness of their 
proposals and mobilize citizens to vote in the approval 
referendum. 
4.3. Mobilizing 
The development of a frame that was consistent with the RPF' s 
governance frame was important for gender equity advocates' 
success. It enabled advocates to present proposals regarding 
gender equity in ways that LCC members and other political elites 
could "hear" and accept as non-threatening to their political 
power. As women's organizations used their influential allies, 
such as Kanakuze and UNIFEM to obtain LCC support, they also 
worked to expand their grassroots support throughout Rwanda. 
The Constitution had to be approved in a national referendum 
before it could be adopted. Developing a national constituency for 
195 CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF RwANDA art. 52. 
196 This provision was amended in December 2005 to state that political 
parties may establish offices at the national and provincial level. They are no 
longer prohibited from establishing officials at the local levels of territorial 
administration. Amendment No.2 of Aug. 12, 2005, CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
RWANDA art. 2, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF RwANDA. 
197 CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA art. 55; Organic Law Governing 
Political Organizations and Politicians, No. 16/2003 art. 42, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA art. 42, No. 42 special Gune 27, 2003). 
198 The MDR was dissolved based on a finding by a parliamentary committee 
that it promoted divisionism. The process used to dissolve the MDR was not 
included in either the Constitution or organic law. The investigation into the 
MDR began before the adoption of the new Constitution or the promulgation of 
organic law governing political parties. 
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constitutional provisiOns advancing women's political 
participation and representation was important for two reasons. 
First, it provided women's organizations with leverage when 
presenting proposals to the LCC. With substantial support behind 
their proposals the organizations could suggest that any 
constitution put to an approval referendum that did not 
adequately address women's political participation and 
representation would likely be defeated. In 2002, women were 
52.3% of the total population and 54.1% of the population aged 20 
to 64.199 Mobilizing a significant portion of the female population 
could be instrumental in determining whether an approval 
referendum would be successful_2oo Additionally, women's 
organizations likely played a significant role in shaping the 
public's perception of the legitimacy and fairness of the 
constitution-making process. Moehler's research on Uganda's 
constitution-making process found that citizens lacked the 
necessary information to independently evaluate the constitution-
making process and the constitution, so they relied on information 
from local elites. When the local elites were supportive of the 
process, citizens described the process as fair and legitimate; 
however, when the local elites were antagonistic, they conveyed 
messages of bias and unfairness to the public. 2o1 Thus messages 
199 U.N. DEr'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, 2003 DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK at table 
7, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.R/34, U.N. Sales No. E/F.06.X111.1 (2006) 
(Population by age, sex and urban/rural residence: latest available year, 1994-
2003) (Rwanda data from 2002). 
200 Without essentializing women and suggesting that all women would 
support the gender equity advocates' proposals, I note the percentage of women 
voters because the "women are necessary" frame targeted all women regardless of 
class or ethnicity. The advocates pursuing the constitutional provisions sought to 
unify women across all lines of potential cleavage and saw the quest for women's 
political participation as universal for all women. Many of the activities 
organized by the gender ministry and the various women's organizations sought 
to enable women to see their commonality and focus on that in improving the 
lives of all women. This was difficult at times because some of the women's 
organizations were ethnically homogeneous in practice, but this was something 
that was not openly discussed. See Newbury & Baldwin, supra note 139, at 105. 
This approach to gender is reflected in the block of women's seats reserved in the 
Chamber of Deputies. Women do not run as members of political parties or as 
formal representatives of any interest other than women's interests. 
201 See Moehler, supra note 12, at 26 (explaining how the opinions of local 
leaders shaped citizens' evaluations of the constitution). Moehler found that the 
relationship between citizen participation and support for the Constitution was 
weak; as citizen participation increased, support for the Constitution did not 
increase significantly. Jd. at 23. She concludes that the views of local elites were 
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from Rwandan women's organizations to their constituents that 
their concerns were being ignored or that the process was biased or 
unfair could have been detrimental to the adoption of the 
Constitution as it was in Kenya. 
Public concern over the substance of the constitution presented 
to the Kenyan public for approval led to its defeat,202 The Kenyan 
Parliament enacted a law, the Consensus Act, which altered the 
constitutional review procedures set out in the Constitution of 
Kenya Review Act.2D3 The Constitution of Kenya Review 
Commission was to conduct, promote, and facilitate civic 
education to stimulate public discussion and awareness of 
constitutional issues; set up district-level documentation centers; 
create a constituency constitutional forum; conduct public hearings 
to collect public views; and prepare a report and recommendations 
based on the views obtained that would serve as the basis for 
debate at a National Constitutional Conference.204 The national 
conference participants included 223 members of parliament, 210 
district representative, 126 representatives from civil society and 
other interest groups, and 41 representatives of political parties.zos 
The conference was held in Bomas, Kenya, beginning on April30, 
2003, and lasted approximately one month. The draft constitution 
more influential in shaping how individuals evaluated the constitution-making 
process and the resulting Constitution. I d. at 30. 
202 See James A Gathii, Popular Authorship and Constitution Making: Comparing 
and Contrasting the DRC and Kenya, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). 
203 Parliament enacted the Constitution of Kenya Review Act in 2000 to 
facilitate a comprehensive review of the constitution. The act called for the 
public's participation in the review process, providing the first opportunity for 
everyday Kenyans to take part in reviewing the constitution. See Hassan, supra 
note 76 (providing the first comprehensive review of Kenya's constitution since 
the Lancaster House Constitution was adopted in 1963). Kenya's constitution was 
amended significantly between 1965 and 1967 to centralize powers that had been 
decentralized in the Lancaster House Constitution. The two major Kenyan 
parties, KANU and KADU, agreed to a decentralized system because they 
favored a regional-based system that provided for an equitable distribution of the 
country's resources. See Joseph Martin Shikuku, Building on the Lancaster House 
Experience (Sept. 15, 2001), available at http:/ jwww.commonlii.org/kejother/ 
KECKRC/2001/S.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (paper presented to the 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission Workshop on the Interpretation of its 
Mandate) (providing a brief history of the development of the Kenya 
Constitution). 
204 Hassan, supra note 76, at *2. 
205 ld.; see NAT'L CONST. CONFERENCE HANDBOOK (2003). The twenty-nine 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commissioners would be appointed by parliament 
and the president, but would not vote at the conference. 
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agreed upon in Bomas-the Bomas Draft-significantly curtailed 
presidential powers and introduced an elected prime minister who 
would chair cabinet meetings, coordinate the work of the 
government ministries, and prepare legislation. 206 
The Consensus Act authorized Parliament to unilaterally revise 
the draft constitution prepared during the National Constitutional 
Conference. Civil society organizations were actively involved in 
publicizing the fact that Parliament was considering the act and the 
effect it would have on the constitutional review process. Despite 
the protests that ensued, Parliament passed the Consensus Act and 
relied on it to revise the Bomas Draft. The Parliament-revised 
constitution, the Kilifi Draft, strengthened presidential powers and 
retained the prime minister position, but made it a position 
appointed by the president rather than an elected position. Civil 
society organizations were unsuccessful in preventing Parliament 
from revising the Bomas Draft, but it undoubtedly helped civil 
society organizations mobilize their communities to ensure that the 
internal inclusion achieved during the National Constitutional 
Conference would not be destroyed by approving the Kilifi Draft. 
They were successful in this effort. The Kilifi Draft was rejected in 
the November 21, 2005, referendum with 43% of voters supporting 
the draft and 57% rejecting it_207 
The second reason developing a national constituency that 
supported constitutional provisions regarding women's political 
participation and representation was important was to respond to 
counterarguments potentially advanced by other citizens or civil 
society organizations. Many of the accounts about the quest for 
constitutional provisions addressing women's political 
participation note the tensions between traditional Rwandan 
norms regarding women in public spaces and the calls for 
women's independent representation and participation within a 
national legislative body.2os To address the inevitable 
206 These revisions address the concerns Kenyans expressed during the 
CKRC's public hearings. It has been reported that "the majority of Kenyans 
prefer the powers of the president trimmed and shared out with a proposed office 
of the prime minister to guard against abuse of power." Joyce Mulama, Challenges 
2005-2006: Kenya's New Constitution in Limbo, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 16, 2005, 
http:/ jwww.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=31456. 
207 Nixon Ng'ang'a & Ben Agina, Resounding No, THE STANDARD, Nov. 23, 
2005, http:// www.eastandard.net/ archives/ cl/lun_news/ news. php?articleid 
=32609. 
208 Louis Rusa, director of the Division of Gender, Health, and Social Affairs 
for Kigali-Ngali Province stated that he tries to "train men and women to 'show 
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counterarguments and the· development of public support for 
those arguments it was important for gender equity advocates to 
disseminate their "women are necessary" frame in public. Just as 
significant public support for women's political participation 
provisions could lead to a veto of an unresponsive constitution, a 
responsive constitution could cause rejection by opponents. 
International organizations concerned about women's issues 
played a significant role in focusing Rwandan NGO attention on 
governance matters and financially supporting the domestic 
mobilization effort.2D9 The success of this collaboration is reflected 
in the LCC report, Fundamental Ideas on the New Constitution, 
presenting the results of the public consultation process. With 
regard to gender the report states that citizens thought that gender 
equity was achievable if individuals are equal before the law. 
Furthermore, gender-based affirmative action should be provided 
by law, protected in decision-making bodies, education, and the 
economy.210 These statements reflect the content discussed at the 
sensitization workshops organized by international organizations 
like UNIFEM to educate the population about Rwanda's 
international legal obligations regarding gender. 
As discussed at the beginning of this Section, there was a 
proliferation of women's organizations throughout Rwanda after 
the genocide to provide women with concrete support in 
reconstructing their lives. These organizations were critically 
important in enabling international organizations like UNIFEM 
and local NGOs like Pro-Femmes to form a national network. 
them the benefits of the promotion of women, that they can contribute to the 
family, [and] that development cannot come from men only," but that "some men 
are 'very resistant [to the inclusion of gender issues and women in government] 
because of culture."' POWLEY, supra note 154, at 19-20 (alterations in the original). 
Berthe Mukamusoni, a female parliamentarian, noted that, "[i]n the history of our 
country and society, women could not go in public with men. Where men were, 
women were not supposed to talk, to show their needs. Men were to talk and 
think for them." Id. at 21. 
209 The influential role that international women's organizations, like 
UNIFEM, were able to play in Rwanda through financial and political support 
demonstrates the power that women and feminist ideas have and are gaining in 
international settings. See Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Sharnir & 
Chantal Thomas, From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to 
Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary 
Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335 (2006) (discussing the growth of 
Governance Feminism or the "the installation of feminist and feminist ideas in 
actual legal-institutional power."). 
21o Fundamental Ideas Report, supra note 63. 
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Through this network they were able to develop national support 
for constitutional provisions guaranteeing women's political 
participation and representation. The process of developing such 
support began with the gender sensitization workshops. Madeline 
Mukarwigema was a member of Duhozanye-an organization that 
worked to respond to the urgent needs of 330 widows and 
widowers- through which she received gender training. 
Mukarwigema reported that before the training she and other 
Duhozanye members never realized the gendered nature of their 
struggles. 
We never took gender into consideration. We saw 
ourselves as widows who were trying to get by .... Before 
we received training in gender, we thought that we had 
arrived at the summit of sexual equality because we were 
doing jobs and tasks which had previously been reserved 
for men only, like masonry, milking cows etc ... [.] After the 
training, we saw that we had an incomplete understanding 
of gender. 211 
The sensitization workshops and other meetings and 
interactions with women throughout the country used the "women 
are necessary" frame to discuss the problems facing women in 
post-genocide Rwanda and offered women's political 
representation and participation as a solution. Not only were 
women told that political representation and participation were 
important aspects of gender equity, the gender equity advocates 
also reinforced the prevalent belief amongst women that women 
were critically important for the reconstruction of post-genocide 
Rwanda.212 The organizations argued that constitutionally 
guaranteed political representation was necessary to ensure that 
women would be able to play the roles they desired in planning 
and implementing the state's reconstruction.2t3 
211 WOMEN TAKING A LEAD, supra note 121, at 17-18 (second omission in the 
original). 
212 See, e.g., id. at 25-28 (explaining the process and importance of gender 
education and training in Rwanda). 
213 See, e.g., id. at 27 (arguing the importance of women in elected positions); 
see also Heather B. Hamilton, Rwanda's Women: The Key to Reconstruction, J. 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISfANCE, Jan. 10, 2000, available at http:/ jwww.reliefweb.int/ 
rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/OCHA-64CR56?0penDocument; Jeanne Izabiliza, The 
Role of Women in Reconstruction: Experience of Rwanda 2-4, Presentation 
Delivered at Empowering Women in the Great Lakes Region: Violence, Peace, and 
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Gender equity advocates were successful in obtaining their 
desired constitutional guarantees as a result of their collective 
action. Through Pro-Femmes, these advocates successfully 
mobilized, obtained elite allies, and created and implemented an 
effective framing strategy. It was these factors that enabled gender 
equity advocates to make substantive contributions in a 
constitution-making system that limited internal inclusion to 
political elites and their allies. Rwanda adopted an external 
participatory system. Rather than opening the floodgates of 
participatory democratic governance, the use of this system 
severely limited who within the society would be able to make 
substantive contributions. This opportunity was limited to those 
who became political insiders, which was not equally available to 
all citizens and required tightly orchestrated collective action.214 
Women's Leadership Conference Gune 2005) (available at 
http:/ jportal.unesco.org/shsjen/ev.php-URL_ID=9184&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC 
&URL_SECTION=20l.html) (advocating for an increase in female participation in 
decision-making and policy implementation as the most effective means of 
contribution to reconciliation efforts). 
214 Soon after the war and genocide ended in Rwanda, women's 
organizations reappeared to help women deal with the unique challenges they 
were facing as widows, mothers, and heads of households. Through meetings 
and activities to address practical challenges like access to income-generating 
activities, shelter, food production resources, and the care of orphans, women 
began to discuss the need for political solutions and political representation. See, 
e.g., Newbury & Baldwin, supra note 139, at 98 (explaining the development of 
informal and formal women's organizations after the 1994 genocide); see POWLEY, 
supra note 154, at 19 (discussing the Rwandan Ministry of Gender and Women in 
Development programs for women's empowerment); WOMEN TAKING A LEAD, 
supra note 121, at 17-18 (providing narratives of Rwandan women who have 
become involved in gender work). Through collaborations with female members 
of parliament and the ministry in charge of gender issues, sensitization 
workshops were held throughout the country. 
Pro-Femmes worked closely with MIGEPROFE, the Forum of Women 
Parliamentarians, and the LCC to ensure that their concerns were adequately 
addressed in the draft constitution. See WoMEN IN PARLIAMENT, supra note 150, at 
143, 146 (describing decision-making process); WOMEN TAKING A LEAD, supra note 
121, at 16. Once Pro-Femmes was satisfied that its issues were sufficiently 
reflected in the draft constitution, the organization implemented a mobilization 
campaign to encourage women to support the draft constitution in the national 
referendum. See WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT, supra note 150, at 146 (explaining how 
Pro-Femmes publicized the relevant changes to the draft constitution); WoMEN 
TAKING A LEAD, supra note 121, at 16 (discussing the inclusion of women and 
women's issues in the drafting of the new Rwandan constitution). Through their 
member NGOs and the network established during the sensitization process, Pro-
Femmes was able to access women throughout the country and follow up on their 
earlier education and consultation work to encourage women to vote in support 
of the constitution in the national referendum. The positive reports from Pro-
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5. CONCLUSION 
Gender equity advocates successfully obtained their desired 
outcomes-constitutional prov1s1ons guaranteeing women's 
political participation and representation, and gender equity in 
public and private life- through an external participatory system. 
Their success resulted from engaging in sustained collective action 
that entailed mobilizing, obtaining influential allies, and 
implementing an effective framing strategy. The Rwandan case 
study suggests that the use of external participatory systems has 
the potential to assist in implementing moderate democratic 
reforms. The focus of these systems on gaining legitimacy and 
public support provides an opportunity for organized 
constituencies to successfully lobby for democratic reforms that are 
consistent with the elite-created governance plan. The quest for 
legitimacy and public support is, however, balanced with a desire 
to implement a specific governance system that maintains a 
particular balance of power. 
Historical experiences with politics and political power being a 
zero-sum game cause many new political leaders in post-conflict 
states a great deal of anxiety about the prospect of losing political 
power. The loss of political power would mean not only losing 
political influence, but becoming vulnerable to political, economic, 
and social marginalization. Creating a public-driven governance 
system and constitution is likely to be seen as a risky venture that 
other political organizations within the state could take advantage 
of to gain exclusive political power. The security conditions, 
nascent political institutions, and civil society in post-conflict states 
make this likelihood a distinct possibility. Thus external 
participatory systems are likely to prevail in post-conflict states. 
They enable the governing elites to create the blueprint for the 
state's constitution and governance system, obtain public support, 
and develop domestic legitimacy. The institutions, procedures, 
and modes of participation utilized in an external participatory 
system focus on obtaining support and legitimacy for a specific 
governance plan at the expense of engaging the public in creating a 
long-term effective governance system. Participatory constitution 
making is supported by numerous states, inter-governmental 
Femmes and other women's organizations regarding the legitimacy and fairness 
of the process and the substance of the Constitution undoubtedly played a 
significant role in the overwhelming support for the Constitution amongst citizens 
concerned about gender equity. See Moehler, supra note 12, at 26-27. 
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organizations, and non-governmental organizations because it is 
seen as having the potential of facilitating national conversations 
about the endemic political, economic, and social problems facing 
the society. The conversations, discussions, and deliberations are 
seen as providing forums in which workable solutions can be 
identified, agreed upon, and memorialized in a constitution. 
External participatory systems do not, however, enable these 
challenging conversations and deliberations to take place within 
the decision-making forums. Public support and legitimacy are 
important aspects of democratic governance, but they will be 
difficult to sustain if the government does not effectively address 
political, economic, and social exclusion. 
The challenge facing international legal scholars and 
practitioners is how to assist the governments of post-conflict 
states in transitioning from the use of external participatory 
systems to internal participatory systems. This transition involves 
citizens and political elites seeing politics and political power as 
something other than a zero-sum game and viewing disagreement 
and dissent as necessary components · of democratic dialogue. 
Recognizing the differences in the intent of the designers of such 
systems and the institutions and procedures utilized provides a 
starting point for thinking about how to structure such a transition. 
